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Article 
An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s 
Pardon Power 
AARON RAPPAPORT 
Most commentators assume that, except for the few restrictions expressly 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the President’s pardon power is unlimited. This 
Paper suggests that this common view is mistaken in at least one unexpected way. 
Presidential pardons must satisfy a modest procedural rule: they must list the 
specific crimes covered by the pardon. The “specificity requirement” means that 
vague and broadly worded pardons are invalid. 
This claim bears a significant burden of persuasion, since it runs so counter to 
accepted opinion. Nonetheless, that burden can be met. This Paper’s argument rests 
on an originalist understanding of the constitutional text, an approach that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed as the appropriate method for interpreting 
the Pardon Clause. That approach leaves little doubt that a specificity requirement 
is a binding limitation on the President’s pardon power.  
 The final part of this Paper examines the ramifications of the specificity 
requirement for federal criminal investigations, particularly investigations into 
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. The specificity requirement 
may prove surprisingly significant in this latter context, since it both raises the 
political costs, and narrows the legal scope, of any pardon the President might grant 
to former campaign advisors. In effect, the requirement strengthens the hand of 
investigators, increasing the likelihood that defendants will cooperate with the 
prosecution. In so doing, the specificity requirement serves as an unexpected ally in 
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An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s 
Pardon Power 
AARON RAPPAPORT * 
INTRODUCTION 
Not since President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon has the pardon power 
been the focus of so much media and public attention. As Donald Trump’s 
legal troubles have multiplied, speculation has intensified that the President 
may attempt to use the power to insulate associates and advisors from 
criminal liability.1 A pardon, it is believed, would eliminate the risk of 
federal prosecution, undermining the leverage prosecutors have to persuade 
these men to offer possibly incriminating information about the President.   
To be sure, a federal pardon would not eliminate all pressure on Trump’s 
associates. Federal pardons, after all, insulate individuals only from federal 
prosecutions, not state charges. The New York State Attorney General, 
among others, has been looking into allegations of wrongdoing by some of 
Trump’s associates.2 Nonetheless, eliminating federal exposure would 
mitigate the potential threats against these individuals and, depending on the 
specific facts of the cases, might eliminate criminal liability entirely. In this 
sense, a federal pardon could pose a significant roadblock to prosecutors 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks to Mark Osler, 
Ian Williams, and Zachary Price for comments on an earlier version of this Article. Special thanks to 
Erin Barlow, Jennifer Bentley, Deborah Brundy, Ally Girouard, Sarah Glendon, Brenly Pereira, and 
Andrew Johnson for exceptional research assistance.   
1 Even more controversially, the President might attempt to pardon himself. That possibility raises 
distinct legal issues that have been addressed in other papers. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The 
Constitutional Case Against Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 781 (1996) (discussing the 
constitutionality of a presidential self-pardon through a historical, textual, structural, and doctrinal 
analysis); Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis 
of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 222 (1999) (analyzing the self-pardon 
from various perspectives to conclude that the self-pardon is constitutional); Mark Strasser, The Limits 
of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 
85, 149–52 (2002) (discussing the presidential self-pardon). As such, the lawfulness of self-pardons is 
not directly addressed below. 
2 See, e.g., Natasha Bertrand, New York Prosecutors May Pose a Bigger Threat to Trump than 
Mueller, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/new-york-
prosecutors-allen-weisselberg-trump/568516/; David A. Fahrenthold, New York Attorney General Moves 






274 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
hoping to unravel what precisely happened during the presidential election 
of 2016. 
If Trump pardons one or more of these individuals, could an argument 
be made that these pardons are invalid? The common view is “no.” The 
general assumption is that the President’s pardon power is virtually 
unlimited. The President might suffer political fallout from granting 
immunity, but the pardons themselves are widely seen as beyond judicial 
review. That is true even if those pardons are issued for corrupt or 
self-interested reasons.3  
This Paper suggests that this common view is mistaken in at least one 
unexpected way. Though the substantive scope of the pardon power is broad, 
one modest procedural rule must be followed: the pardon must identify the 
specific crimes covered by the order.4 The “specificity requirement,” as I 
will call it, means that vague and broadly worded pardons are not valid.5 
The claim that a specificity requirement exists may sound doubtful, 
since it runs against the widespread view that the President’s pardon power 
is unfettered. It also seems to run against historical practice. President Ford’s 
pardon of Nixon was but the most famous example of a vague and general 
pardon that brought a federal prosecution to a halt.6 According to its terms, 
Nixon’s pardon applied to “all offenses against the United States” during his 
administration; the wrongdoings were never specified.7 Even beyond this 
famous (or, depending on one’s viewpoint, infamous) example, the 
existence of a specificity requirement has never been acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court.8  
                                                                                                                     
3 Several commentators have suggested that a pardon issued for corrupt reasons could result in a 
separate charge against the President for obstruction of justice. See, e.g., Meghan Keneally, Yes, Trump 
Can Pardon Manafort and Cohen, But It Would Be a ‘Legal and Strategic Error,’ Expert Says, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:23 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-pardon-manafort-cohen-legal-
strategic-error-expert/story?id=57355504; James D. Robenalt, The Pardon Power Can Be Used to 
Obstruct Justice. Just Ask Richard Nixon, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/168686. For a somewhat more skeptical view, see Daniel J. 
Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1281–82 (2018). 
However, even if separate obstruction charges could be brought, the pardons themselves would likely be 
upheld and remain binding. 
4 This is a procedural constraint in the sense that it imposes restrictions on how pardons are 
structured, rather than on who or what can be pardoned. 
5 This is not the first paper to mention a specificity requirement. In a piece published after the 
Watergate controversy, Hugh Macgill explores the possibility of such a requirement. See Hugh C. 
Macgill, The Nixon Pardon: Limits on the Benign Prerogative, 7 CONN. L. REV. 56, 74–84 (1974) 
(discussing several possible constraints on the President’s pardon power, including the specificity 
requirement). This Article builds and expands upon that work.    
6 The significance of this pardon is discussed in more depth later in this Paper. See infra Part III.B. 
7 Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,601–02 (Sept. 10, 1974).  
8 Petitioners before the Supreme Court have raised the specificity argument at least once. In Burdick 
v. United States, the petitioner argued that, “the pardon is illegal for the absence of specification, not 
reciting the offenses upon which it is intended to operate; worthless, therefore, as immunity.” 236 U.S. 
79, 93 (1915). The Court, however, declined to rule on the issue, preferring instead to deny the 
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Given this background, the claim that a specificity requirement exists 
faces a heavy burden of persuasion. Nonetheless, the burden can be met. 
This Paper demonstrates that the arguments in favor of a specificity 
requirement are not only plausible, but highly persuasive. The argument 
rests on an originalist reading of the pardon power, an approach that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed for interpreting the Pardon Clause. 
The Court has explained that original intent can be discerned by looking at 
English practices before the Constitution’s drafting. The common law, in 
short, informed the Framers’ understanding of the President’s pardon power.   
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little effort has been made to explore the 
dimensions of the pardon power in England during the first half of the 
eighteenth century.9 A closer look reveals that a specificity requirement was 
widely understood to exist in English law during the period. In this regard, 
the originalist methodology favored by the Supreme Court confirms that a 
specificity requirement should be part of our own understanding of the 
pardon power in the U.S. Constitution. 
Even if a specificity requirement exists, one might wonder whether it 
would matter as a check on presidential misuse of the pardon. A specificity 
requirement, after all, is a rather modest restriction; it does not prevent a 
President from issuing a pardon to whomever he wishes on whatever 
grounds. Consequently, it would not prevent the President from pardoning 
any of his associates, for any crime committed, for any reason.   
Yet, a specificity requirement might prove unexpectantly significant, 
especially in cases where the President’s associates have been accused of 
crimes that, if specified in a pardon document, would prove highly 
embarrassing to the President himself. It is one thing for a President to offer 
a general, non-specific pardon that covers “all crimes committed” by an 
associate. It is quite another to list a series of offenses, such as money 
laundering, wire fraud, and (in the worst case) conspiracy to interfere with 
the electoral process. It is widely understood that the receipt of a pardon 
represents an acceptance of guilt.10 Consequently, the specific articulation 
of crimes pardoned offers the public a clear idea of what precisely the 
offender is guilty of, while a vague pardon allows the President to avoid 
                                                                                                                     
petitioner’s claim on other grounds. Id. at 93–95. 
9 There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A 
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 499–500 (1977) (examining English pardon power 
in the first half of the eighteenth century); Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in 
England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 51–62 (1963) (same).  
10 See Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94 (noting that a pardon requires an individual “to confess his guilt in 
order to avoid a conviction of it”); see also Pardoning Power, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 228 (1865) (“There 
can be no pardon where there is no actual or imputed guilt.”). For a different and nuanced view, see 





276 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
responsibility by hiding behind the ambiguity of the pardon’s general 
language. In this regard, a specificity requirement raises the political costs 
of making a pardon.   
The power of the specificity requirement is not surprising. It is premised 
on the idea that transparency is the best disinfectant when it comes to 
governmental abuse. Requiring clarity about what is being pardoned can 
help deter the most egregious uses of the pardon—those employed for 
partisan or corrupt reasons. It can also promote political accountability—and 
in extreme cases trigger impeachment proceedings—should the power of the 
pardon be misused. In short, it helps ensure that the “benign prerogative” of 
the pardon remains truly benign.11   
This Paper proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the importance of 
using an originalist methodology when interpreting the Pardon Clause of the 
Constitution and how that approach requires a careful exhumation of 
common law practices at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. Part II 
examines these common law practices in detail. This Part demonstrates that 
a clear specificity requirement existed in the common law at the time of the 
Constitution’s drafting. It also explains how the requirement is consistent 
with core constitutional values embraced by the Framers during the drafting 
period. 
Part III evaluates two major counterarguments. One is a textual 
argument, grounded in the specific language of the Pardon Clause. The other 
is an argument based on historical practice, which is essentially an argument 
that the specificity requirement is invalid because it is inconsistent with the 
way pardons have been used in the past. Both objections, we will see, are 
superficially appealing but ultimately unpersuasive. 
Part IV returns to the controversies surrounding President Trump and 
his inner circle of advisors and associates. This Part elaborates how the 
specificity requirement could generate problems for the President should he 
attempt to use the pardon power to short-circuit federal investigations into 
possible Administration corruption. The specificity requirement limits the 
effectiveness of any pardon that Trump issues, thus diminishing its value to 
any offender contemplating whether to cooperate with investigators. In 
doing so, the specificity requirement serves as an unexpected ally in the fight 
for political accountability and in defense of the rule of law. 
I. THE PARDON POWER 
It is widely recognized that the federal pardon power is expansive in its 
scope. The Constitution provides that: “The President . . . shall have Power 
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, 
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except in Cases of Impeachment.”12 As the Supreme Court has affirmed, the 
pardon power has few limitations. The President can issue a pardon at any 
time after a crime has been committed, even prior to arrest or indictment.13 
The pardon can be granted for any crime without exception.14 The President 
need not articulate reasons for the pardon. Indeed, it is commonly thought 
that the motivation for the pardon is not reviewable by courts regardless of 
the appearance of unseemly or inappropriate motivations.15 Finally, the 
pardon power cannot be restricted by Congress through legislation.16    
Of course, the pardon power is not entirely unfettered. The text of the 
Constitution spells out two clear constraints. First, the power conferred by 
the Constitution is restricted to federal crimes (“offenses against the United 
States”).17 Second, a pardon cannot insulate an official from the effects of 
an impeachment proceeding.18 Apart from these textual constraints, 
however, many doubt whether any other limit exists. In dicta, the Supreme 
Court itself has stated that, beyond these two exceptions, “[t]he power thus 
conferred is unlimited.”19  
Yet the Court’s own decisions recognize that the reality is more 
complicated. In various rulings, the Supreme Court has endorsed modest 
non-textual limits on the validity of pardons. These might be called 
“implicit” limitations on the pardon power. In Burdick v. United States, for 
example, the Court stated that a pardon is valid only if accepted by the 
defendant.20 Thus, “acceptance” serves as a limitation on the pardon’s 
                                                                                                                     
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
13 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“The executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses 
after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial.”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
333, 380 (1867) (“The [pardon] power . . . may be exercised at any time after [the] commission [of a 
crime], either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and 
judgment. . . . If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent 
upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and 
restores him to all his civil rights . . . .”). This view also seems to be supported by debates at the 
constitutional convention—as William Duker writes, during the debates on the pardon power, “Luther 
Martin moved to insert ‘after conviction’ after the words ‘reprieves and pardons,’ but withdrew the 
motion after the persuasive argument of Mr. Wilson that a ‘pardon before conviction might be necessary, 
in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices.’” Duker, supra note 9, at 501–02 (citation omitted). 
14 See Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (The pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law.”). 
15 See 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 332 (1892) (“A pardon is a gracious act of mercy resting on any 
ground which the Executive may regard as sufficient to call for its exercise.”); 20 RULING CASE LAW 
518, 533 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1918) [hereinafter RULING CASE LAW] 
(“Whatever may have been the reasons for granting the pardon, the courts cannot decline to give it effect, 
if it be valid upon its face.”). 
16  Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (“This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. . . . 
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.”).  
17 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
18 Id. 
19 Garland, 71 U.S. at 380. 
20 See 236 U.S. 79, 89–91 (1915) (explaining that the convict must accept pardon for it to be 
effective). The circumstances under which an offender might reject a pardon are, as one might expect, 
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validity. Similarly, the Supreme Court has ruled that a pardon must be 
pleaded to be valid.21 Failure to plead a pardon means that the court need not 
and should not take cognizance of it. In a separate case, the Supreme Court 
ruled that a President may pardon for criminal contempt but may not pardon 
a case involving civil contempt even if the sanction for that contempt is 
prison.22 Finally, the President cannot pardon a crime before it has been 
committed.23   
These examples illustrate that the Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized 
certain, modest, non-textual limitations on the pardon power. The question 
naturally arises: on what basis does the Court find these implicit limitations? 
The methodology employed by the Court is typically an originalist one: the 
Court has sought to identify the Framers’ understandings regarding the 
scope of the pardon power at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.  
What sort of information informs that assessment? In the case of 
pardons, the sources are limited. The constitutional debates, for example, 
contain few references to the pardon power, and none are particularly 
substantive.24 The Federalist Papers provide little more insight, offering a 
                                                                                                                     
quite unusual. In Burdick, the defendant refused to testify against a co-conspirator on the grounds that 
his testimony might be self-incriminating. Id. at 86. The President gave the defendant a pardon to nullify 
that argument, and thus to prevent him from “taking the Fifth.” Id. To escape the snare, the defendant 
refused to accept the pardon. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that, by refusing the pardon, the defendant 
voided the grant, undermining the prosecution’s strategy. Id. at 89–91.  
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of this rule, holding that the 
defendant’s consent was not necessary when the President seeks to reduce a capital sentence to life in 
prison. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927). In a four-page opinion, the Court noted that the 
“opposite answer would . . . deprive [the President] of the power in the most important cases and require 
him to permit an execution which he had decided ought not to take place.” Id. at 487. The Court thus 
concluded: “We are of opinion that the reasoning of Burdick v. United States, is not to be extended to the 
present case.” Id. at 487–88 (internal citation omitted). 
21 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162 (1833). 
22 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925).   
23 See id. at 120 (affirming in dicta that pardons will apply after commission of offense); Garland, 
71 U.S. at 380 (same). The Department of Justice has long adopted this position, as well. See, e.g., 6 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854) (“[I]f a pardon could be granted in advance for offences to be committed 
thereafter, it would include a power to grant indulgences to commit crimes and offences, to license vice, 
to dispense with the sanction of the laws, without good motive, without reason, but solely by arbitrary 
will. . . . A pardon for an offence not yet committed would be void.”). 
This may seem self-evident, but it certainly is not the only possible approach. In early English 
history, the King of England claimed the right to grant “dispensations,” which were essentially a license 
to violate the law. See 6 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (“That in 
the Middle Ages a suspending and dispensing power was vested in the king is unquestionable.”); Zachary 
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 690 n.63 (2014) (describing 
kings’ access to dispensing power). The use of the power by James II was widely condemned, and the 
practice was ultimately prohibited by the English Bill of Rights. An Act Declaring the Rights and 
Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, 
7 (Eng.). 
24 Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974) (“The records of the Constitutional Convention, as 
noted earlier, reveal little discussion or debate on § 2, cl. 1, of Art. II.”).   
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single substantive discussion of the pardon power.25 Specifically, in 
Federalist 74, Hamilton defends the importance of giving the President 
alone the power to pardon. He concludes: “[T]he benign prerogative of 
pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”26 That 
statement confirms that the power is broad, but at the same time it 
acknowledges that some constraints on that power may be necessary and 
appropriate. 
Given the haziness of these sources, the Supreme Court has looked 
elsewhere for insight into the Founders’ intent. Specifically, it has 
affirmed—repeatedly and consistently—that the key source for interpreting 
the scope of the pardon power should be English common law practices 
immediately before the drafting of the Constitution.27 Limitations on the 
pardon power that existed at common law should be incorporated into the 
constitutional scheme. As the Supreme Court explained in Ex parte 
Grossman: 
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely 
except by reference to the common law and to British 
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and 
adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who 
submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the 
Thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere 
of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. 
. . . [W]hen they came to put their conclusions into the form of 
fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in 
terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly 
and easily understood.28 
It was this deep familiarity with English law that explains why the 
Framers adopted the pardon authority with so little debate concerning its 
precise scope and meaning.29 In practice, the Supreme Court has relied upon 
                                                                                                                     
25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 261–62 (“[T]he draftsmen were well acquainted with the English 
Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it existed in 1787.”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 307, 311 (1855) (“At the time of the adoption of the constitution, American statesmen were 
conversant with the laws of England, and familiar with the prerogatives exercised by the crown. . . . At 
that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word pardon. . . . We must 
then give the word the same meaning as prevailed here and in England at the time it found a place in the 
constitution.”); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (“As this power had been 
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to 
whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the 
operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which 
it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.”).  
28 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 108–09.  
29 Schick, 419 U.S. at 260 (Because of their familiarity with the common law, the Framers did not 
“devote extended debate to [the Pardon Clause’s] meaning.”). 
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these common law practices to identify many of the non-textual constraints 
on the pardon power, including cases holding that a pardon is valid only if 
accepted and pleaded by the defendant.30 The same approach underlies the 
Court’s ruling that pardons may be granted for criminal but not civil 
contempt.31 Finally, the Court has relied on common law practices to resolve 
certain questions about the pardon’s operation, such as whether the President 
may issue “conditional” pardons.32  
In short, the Supreme Court has made clear that certain implicit 
limitations on the pardon power exist, and that these are rooted in the 
common law practices in use at the time of the Founding. The question then 
follows: Do other common law limitations exist, limitations that have yet to 
be recognized by the Court? In particular, does the common law embrace a 
“specificity requirement”? The answer, as the next part explains, is yes. 
II. PARDONS AND THE COMMON LAW 
The English common law is sometimes discussed as if it has a static 
meaning. But of course, the content of the English common law evolved 
over time as English society changed. Between the Middle Ages and the 
eighteenth century, England transformed from a near-absolute monarchy to 
something much closer to a representative government. The contours of the 
pardon power, a central prerogative of the Crown, changed accordingly. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court observed relatively recently, “[t]he history of [the 
pardon] power, which was centuries old, reveals a gradual contraction to 
avoid its abuse and misuse. Changes were made as potential or actual abuses 
were perceived . . . .”33 The implication is that our attention should be 
focused more on the common law authorities of the eighteenth century, the 
period right before the Constitution’s drafting, than on earlier ages.  
At the same time, to fully appreciate the common law practices at the 
time of the American Revolution, it is useful to have a historical perspective. 
Such a perspective highlights how restrictions on the pardon power in the 
mid-eighteenth century built upon limitations established in earlier periods. 
For that reason, the first section below briefly examines the early history of 
                                                                                                                     
30 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89–90 (1915) (relying on common law practices to hold 
that a pardon is only effective if accepted); Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 161–62 (same). 
31 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111 (explaining that in distinguishing between pardons for civil and 
criminal contempt, the Court expressly relies on English practices at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption). 
32 Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310–14 (1855). 
33 Schick, 419 U.S. at 260–61. As John Yoo put it, “[t]he eighteenth-century British constitution 
was composed of a series of unwritten principles . . . . These principles, which defined the relationship 
between the government and its people, and between the Crown and Parliament, had undergone 
significant change during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The meaning and significance of 
these constitutional developments would have been familiar to ratifiers of the American Constitution.” 
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 31–32 (2005). 
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the pardon power in England, a period during which the early seeds of the 
specificity requirement were laid. The second section looks at the events 
leading to the Glorious Revolution, a pivotal event in the transformation of 
English political society. The third section then examines the period after 
the English Revolution (and immediately before the American one), when 
broader limits on the King’s pardon power were imposed.34  
A. Pardons Before the Glorious Revolution 
Evidence of the King’s power to pardon can be found early in English 
history. During the Anglo-Saxon period, the King was seen as having the 
power to grant mercy, a power only strengthened with the Norman conquest 
in the eleventh century.35 The power was not unique to the King—the 
Church and other entities shared the power to pardon—but the King was 
seen as the primary holder of that power.36  
The centrality of the King in English society gave the pardon power a 
certain logic. Since crimes were offenses against the King, the King could 
grant mercy to criminals at his discretion. Of course, this ancient prerogative 
was not without its downsides. As a tool of discretion, the pardon power 
could be—and often was—abused. Pardons were granted at the request of 
favored nobles or offered in return for compensation or loyalty.37 
Parliament’s concerns about these kinds of abuses triggered a number of 
efforts to restrict its operation, including several during the fourteenth 
century. Most were either ignored or repealed under pressure from the 
King.38 
                                                                                                                     
34 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is a convenient point of demarcation in this discussion. In the 
centuries prior to that event, the King tended to have the upper hand over Parliament; the pardon power 
was correspondingly broad in scope. In the decades afterwards, Parliament was resurgent, and the pardon 
power was subject to increasing attempts at curtailment. We are not alone in focusing on the post-1688 
period. See Patrick Cowlishaw, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. 149, 159–60 
(1975) (asserting that focus should be on the post-1688 era because separation of powers becomes more 
significant in that period in England). Whether the Glorious Revolution itself marked a dramatic change 
in the institutional structure of English society, or whether it was a small part of a broader trend, remains 
a point of dispute among historians. See Gary W. Cox, Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional 
Watershed?, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 567, 568 (2012) (“I argue that the Glorious Revolution should have 
affected a narrower range of transactions than North and Weingast envisioned; but that it nonetheless 
had fundamental effects.”); Steven C.A. Pincus & James A. Robinson, What Really Happened During 
the Glorious Revolution? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 729, 2011) (“This 
account of the decisive and innovative nature of the Glorious Revolution has long been disputed by 
specialists in both political and economic history.”). 
35 See Grupp, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
36 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: 
PARDON 28 (1939) [hereinafter 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES]; Grupp, supra note 9, at 55 
(discussing the range of institutions that possessed the power of the pardon). 
37 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 36, at 30, 32 (discussing abuses). 
38 The first efforts occurred at the start of the century, in 1308 and 1309. Duker, supra note 9, at 
479–80. These were largely ignored by the King. Id. at 482. After eliminating his opponents at the Battle 
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But not all. Perhaps the most notable attempt occurred in 1389, when 
Parliament enacted the first “specificity requirement” in English law. The 
Act of 1389 (which I will refer to as the “Pardon Act”) states that no pardon 
“shall be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the death of a man 
slain by await, assault, or malice prepensed, treason, or rape . . . unless the 
same . . . be specified in the same charter.”39 In short, without a specific 
articulation of the listed crimes, the King’s pardon would not be deemed 
valid.40  
The Pardon Act is notable as a forerunner to a much broader particularity 
requirement adopted later. But it was an extremely limited restriction on the 
royal prerogative. As a preliminary matter, it applied only to the most serious 
crimes: treason, rape, and murder. Moreover, it did not bar the King from 
granting pardons for these crimes; it only required him to specify the 
offenses to be absolved (and, in the case at least of homicide, the manner in 
which the killing occurred).41 
In fact, the Act was even more limited than this. Because the King was 
recognized as having the ultimate authority to suspend the law, the Pardon 
Act did not actually bar the King from issuing a non-specific (i.e., a 
                                                                                                                     
of Boroughbridge, the King summoned Parliament. He directed them in 1322 to enact the Statutes of 
York that, among other things, restored the King’s unrestricted powers over the pardon. During the next 
sixty-five years, Parliament repeatedly enacted statutes to restrict the King’s power, but with limited 
effect (in the years 1328, 1336, 1352, and, as discussed in the text, 1389). 
39 Other Statutes Made at Westminster 1389, 13 Rich. 2 c. 1 (Eng.). 
40 The existence of a narrow specificity requirement is confirmed by Edwardo Coke. See, e.g., 
EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 (London, M. 
Flescher, for W. Lee, & D. Pakeman 2d ed. 1648) (“Before this Statute of 13 R. 2, by pardon of all 
felonies, treason was pardoned, and so was murder . . . . At this day by the pardon of all felonies, the 
death of man is not pardoned. These be excellent laws for direction, and for the peace of the Realm.”). 
Coke published his masterwork, the Institutes of the Laws, between 1628 and 1644 (with several parts 
published posthumously), and he is often described as the most influential common law jurist in English 
history. His work is widely seen as an authoritative survey of the common law prior to the Glorious 
Revolution. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment 
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1771 (2008) (“Edward Coke has been described 
as the most important common law jurist in English history.”). 
41 For homicide, it was not enough simply to mention the crime pardoned. The King also had to 
specify details about how the murder was accomplished. To understand the reason for this added 
specificity requirement, a bit of historical background is needed. Under the English common law, murder 
was an expansive doctrine. All killings were treated as murder punishable by death, no matter how the 
killings were carried out. Thus, not only where intentional killings treated as murder, but so were killings 
that were carried out in self-defense or caused accidentally. See Duker, supra note 9, at 479 (“Many of 
the defects in the practice of pardoning rested in the criminal justice system of which it was a part. Prior 
to the sixteenth century, the common law treated all homicides as felonies. In a society with no other 
means of flexibility, the pardon served as the sole instrument of justice for those who should not be 
punished.” (footnote omitted)). For the latter types of homicides, a defendant’s only relief would come 
from the King through a pardon. The common law wanted to discourage pardons for murders carried out 
without such mitigation, those accomplished by “[lying in] []wait, [a]ssault, or [m]alice prepense.” Id. at 
479, 485. The common law courts anticipated that, by requiring the King to articulate the kind of 
homicide, it would deter the King from giving pardons for these homicides, while leaving undisturbed 
the more deserving ones. 
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“general”) pardon for treason, rape, and murder. To do so, the King merely 
had to affirm that he was acting “non obstante”—notwithstanding—
Parliament’s law.42 The King, in short, had the power to suspend the law. 
This power did not mean that the Pardon Act’s restrictions were entirely 
meaningless. Rather, it meant that the King had to highlight the unusual 
nature of his conduct, by acknowledging he was acting contrary to the will 
of Parliament. The hope was that, by requiring the King to either specify the 
offense or announce his desire to suspend the law, the King would be 
deterred from issuing pardons for serious offenses, at least unless significant 
aggravating factors could be identified. Thus, as one commentator put it, 
“Parliament could not conceive that the king would ever pardon an offense 
by name that was attended by such aggravations.”43  
The Pardon Act represents one of the first attempts to constrain the 
King’s pardon powers. The requirement’s limited scope reflected the weak 
position of the Parliament at the time of its passage. Parliament did not 
believe that it could bar the King outright from using general pardons. 
Instead, it adopted a narrow specificity requirement, hoping that specific 
disclosure of the offense would reduce the improper use of pardons, at least 
in the most serious cases. Over the next two centuries, Parliament 
occasionally attempted to restrict the King’s pardon power further.44 These 
efforts, however, were largely ineffective and, over time, the King solidified 
his position as the dominant power in the Kingdom.45 His broad pardon 
authority reflected that lofty position.46 And yet, within a century, the 
balance of power in the Kingdom would be radically transformed.  
                                                                                                                     
42 EDWARDO COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 424–25 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS] (In enacting the statute, Parliament “knew 
that the King could not be restrained by any Act to make a Pardon; for mercy and power to Pardon is a 
Prerogative incident, solely and inseparably to the person of the King: And it hath oft-times been 
adjudged that the King can Pardon Murther by generall words without any expresse mention, with Non 
obstante, the said Statute, see 4 Hen. 4. cap. 31. . . . But in all such cases, although that the King may 
dispense with Statutes, yet a generall dispensation or grant without Non obstante is void.”). 
43 Duker, supra note 9, at 485. As Edward Coke suggested, a specificity requirement would deter 
such actions because publicity and transparency would increase the cost of making such pardons. Thus, 
Coke wrote, this was “the surest way that the Parliament could take to restrain the King to pardon 
Murther, unless that he Pardon it by express terms, which they thought the King would not.” SELECTED 
WRITINGS, supra note 42, at 424.  
44 For example, in 1403, Parliament “enacted a statute affixing a financial penalty on the 
intermediary.” Duker, supra note 9, at 485. 
45 More accurately, during this period, Parliament began to cede power to the King. In 1534, for 
example, Parliament passed the “Statute of Treason,” which made it a crime to “deny the King’s 
supremacy.” Id. at 487 n.60. The next year, it enacted a statute that gave the King sole authority over 
pardons, precluding other institutions (such as the Church) from granting clemency. Id. at 486–87 
(discussing a statute of 1535, which “solidified the king’s jurisdiction over the power to pardon by 
removing the clemency power from all others”); Grupp, supra note 9, at 55 (same).  
46 Apart from the specificity requirement, only a few other constraints existed on the King’s ability 
to grant mercy. For example, according to Coke, the King could pardon robberies, felonies against the 
peace, and homicide only by issuing the pardon by oath and specifying the name of those who offered 
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B. Lord Danby and L’Affaire Francaise 
The seventeenth century marked a period of intense turmoil in England 
over royal power. The battle played out as an institutional battle between the 
King and the Parliament, a conflict with significant religious and cultural 
overtones. The climactic events of the conflict, the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 and the crowning of William of Orange the following year, were 
notable events in the emergence of Parliament as the dominant political 
institution in English society.47 
Not surprisingly, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw 
challenges to the King’s use of the pardon power. The fight over pardons 
came to a head in the 1670s when several attempts were made to restrict the 
King’s power to grant mercy.48 The most dramatic event, and the one most 
relevant for our discussion, occurred at the end of the 1670s. The central 
figure in the dispute was Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, who was the Lord 
High Treasurer of England.  
Danby had the unfortunate luck to be at the center of an explosive 
intrigue involving King Charles of England and Louis XIV of France. To 
understand the Danby affair, one needs to have a sense of the deep 
antagonism at this time between many in Parliament and the Catholic King 
of France. The anti-French contingent in Parliament wanted to renew 
England’s relationship with France’s enemy, the Dutch Republic. Danby 
himself exhibited a strong anti-French orientation, seeing the Dutch 
Republic as the key to the expansion of English commerce.   
King Charles of England, however, had a different agenda. In 1670, 
King Charles signed a secret treaty with Louis XIV (the “secret” Treaty of 
Dover), in which Charles pledged to aid the French in a planned attack on 
the Dutch.49 In addition, Charles promised to convert to Roman Catholicism. 
                                                                                                                     
information to support the pardon (to guard against deception). If the information “be found untrue, the 
Charter shall be disallowed.” COKE, supra note 40, at 236. More generally, Coke affirmed that any false 
information given to the King to obtain the grant of mercy would make the pardon void. Id. at 238. 
47 See Cox, supra note 34, at 595 (“Stuart England was enmeshed in a century-long struggle 
between ‘parliamentary supremacy’ and ‘absolutism.’ To achieve absolute rule, the Crown sought better 
constitutional abilities to control Parliament, to rule legally without Parliament, and to crush Parliament 
militarily. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament enacted statutes, adopted rules and began practices 
that blunted all three prongs of absolutist strategy. . . . Cumulatively, constitutional engineering after the 
Revolution pushed parliamentary supremacy much more than anything that had been tried before, 
because it pushed that project on all three defensive fronts simultaneously.”). 
48 For example, in 1673, a judicial tribunal held that the King was barred from pardoning offenses, 
such as nuisances, that led to continuing harms to private parties. Duker, supra note 9, at 486. In 1679, 
Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act, which among other things prohibited anyone from causing 
an offender to be transported outside the realm (to undermine the offender’s ability to seek habeas). The 
King was barred from granting clemency to violators of the rule. Grupp, supra note 9, at 57. 
49 CLARE JACKSON, CHARLES II: THE STAR KING 31 (2016); MARK KISHLANSKY, THE PENGUIN 
HISTORY OF BRITAIN: A MONARCHY TRANSFORMED, BRITAIN 1630-1714, at 245 (6th ed., Penguin 
Books 1997) (1996). 
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In return, the French King committed to pay Charles 230,000 pounds per 
year.50  
The result was a new war between England and the Dutch (the third 
Anglo-Dutch War). The war erupted in 1672 when the French and English 
fleets joined together to attack the Dutch state. Though the start of the war 
seemed promising for England, the Anglo-French alliance ultimately 
suffered serious strategic setbacks.51 As the war turned, public opinion began 
to sour on King Charles, stoked by growing suspicions that Charles was 
working with France to reverse Protestant domination in England. Fearing 
that his position was becoming untenable, King Charles agreed to terminate 
the war effort. In 1674, the English and Dutch signed a peace treaty ending 
their hostilities.52 
Rather than break off his secret French ties, however, King Charles 
decided to use the growing anti-French fervor as leverage to ask King Louis 
for an increase in his support payments.53 In return for the additional funds, 
the King promised ongoing English neutrality and the suspension 
(“prorogation”) of Parliament.54 Danby was an awkward choice to lead this 
mission, given his past opposition to the French.55 Nonetheless, Danby 
agreed to fulfill his duty on behalf of the King.  
Ultimately, the secret negotiations between Danby and the French King 
broke down, due at least in part to Danby’s intransigence in negotiations.56 
King Louis retaliated by acquiring—and then disclosing—one of Danby’s 
secret letters discussing the agreement between the two Kings.57 
                                                                                                                     
50 R. Hutton, The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670, 29 HIST. J. 297, 303 (1986). 
Louis XIV also agreed to pay Charles 160,000 pounds for the public profession of his Catholicism. Id. 
To put this amount in perspective, in 1667, “the regular revenue of the crown yielded less than 900,000.” 
Id. at 304.  
51 KISHLANSKY, supra note 49, at 246. 
52 C. R. Boxer, Some Second Thoughts on the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674, 19 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 67, 91 (1968). 
53 For background on these machinations, see Clyde L. Grose, Louis XIV’s Financial Relations with 
Charles II and the English Parliament, 1 J. MOD. HIST. 177, 195–97 (1929). See also 42 OSBORNE, 
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 297 (Sidney Lee ed., London, Smith, Elder & Co. 1895). 
54 E. R. Edwards, Montagu, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1660-1690, HIST. 
PARLIAMENT, https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/montagu-ralph-
1638-1709 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Montagu].  
55 A. M. Evans, The Imprisonment of Lord Danby in the Tower, 1679-1684, 12 TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 105, 106–07 (1929). 
56 See Grose, supra note 53, at 184–93 (discussing Danby’s role in the negotiations between the 
two monarchs). 
57 The details of how the letter was obtained are complicated. After receiving the King’s 
instructions, Danby apparently wrote a secret letter to Montagu, the English minister at the Court of 
Versailles. The letter “empower[ed] [Montagu] to make an offer of neutrality for the price of 6,000,000 
livres.” 2 HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION OF 
HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 410 (London, John Murray 8th ed. 1855). Montagu understood 
the importance of secrecy, and he responded to Danby by affirming, “You may be confident of my 
secrecy about this whole affair . . . both for the King’s, your lordship’s and my own sake, for it would be 
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As Louis expected, Parliament was furious at the duplicity of this 
arrangement and immediately resolved on Danby’s impeachment. Though 
the letters were clearly issued at the King’s direction, Danby was a much 
safer target than the King.58 Some contend that the impeachment 
“establish[ed] the principle that no minister can shelter himself behind the 
throne by pleading obedience to the orders of his sovereign.”59 But a more 
accurate appraisal might be that the action reflected the fact that the King 
was untouchable, so a more vulnerable substitute would have to be punished 
in his stead.   
Danby’s impeachment was just the beginning of the saga. Under British 
law, impeachment could include not just removal from office, but criminal 
penalties.60 The Lords thus met to decide whether Danby deserved bail and 
whether his crimes should be treated as a misdemeanor or felony.61 King 
Charles pushed back, issuing Danby a pardon and, later, dissolving 
Parliament.62 Members of Parliament reacted furiously, questioning the 
King’s authority to protect his minister in an impeachment proceeding.63 
The dispute triggered a major conflict over the King’s power to exercise 
the pardon. Although no rule barred the King from granting a pardon in an 
impeachment proceeding, Parliament remained firm, declaring the pardon 
illegal and demanding judgment against Danby (now imprisoned in the 
Tower of London).64 The result was a kind of constitutional crisis: a standoff 
between Parliament and the King. The impasse would last five years. Danby 
would spend most of that time in the Tower of London.65 The crisis did not 
fully resolve itself until King Charles’ unexpected death in 1685 and the 
subsequent coronation of James II. Danby’s sentence was then reversed, and 
                                                                                                                     
no popular or creditable thing if it were known.” Montagu, supra note 54. Nonetheless, Montagu became 
angry after Danby failed to support his efforts to obtain higher office. After receiving compensation from 
the French, Montagu brought to public attention the letters Danby wrote arranging payments from Louis 
to Charles. 42 OSBORNE, supra note 53, at 298.  
58 The King’s ultimate responsibility for the letters was plain. At the bottom of each letter was the 
King’s own handwriting: “This letter is writ by my order, C.R.” CHARLES KNIGHT, POPULAR HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 245 (1880). In addition, Charles himself testified before the House of Lords that Danby 
was acting on the King’s command. See Duker, supra note 9, at 488. 
59 2 HALLAM, supra note 57, at 411.  
60 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 536 (“In England, the judgment on impeachments is not 
confined to mere removal from office, but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the 
offense. The House of Lords, therefore, on a conviction, may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment; 
or perpetual banishment; or forfeiture of goods and lands; or fine and ransom; or imprisonment, as well 
as removal from office, and incapacity to hold office, according to the nature and aggravation of the 
offense.”). 
61 2 HALLAM, supra note 57, at 412–13. 
62 Id. at 414–15. 
63 Duker, supra note 9, at 489–90. 
64 Id. at 493 (“No act on the statute books limited the royal attribute of mercy in cases of 
impeachment.”). 
65 Danby remained “untried [and the] impeachment was never resumed.” Id. at 495. He was released 
on bail from the Tower of London in 1684. Evans, supra note 55, at 133. 
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Parliament was reinstated.66 Even then, Parliament continued to assert that 
the original pardon was invalid.67 It would soon take steps to ensure that the 
King would never again use a pardon to protect his ministers from 
impeachment.  
C. Royal Prerogatives After the Glorious Revolution 
The conflict between the King and Parliament was, on one level, an 
institutional dispute with foreign relations implications. But it played out 
within a broader religious conflict between Protestants, who dominated 
Parliament, and a Royal family who was thought—accurately—to harbor 
Catholic sympathies.68 That broader religious and cultural conflict came to 
a head in 1688, when King James’ Catholic wife, Queen Mary, gave birth to 
a Roman Catholic son and heir, James Francis Edward.69   
The possibility of a Catholic dynasty triggered a backlash.70 Seeking to 
restore Protestant control, influential protestants (including Danby himself) 
invited William of Orange to invade England. The Glorious Revolution, as 
it was called, culminated in 1689 with the crowning of William and his wife, 
Mary II, as the joint sovereigns of England.71 
The Glorious Revolution undermined the idea of the divine right of 
Kings and led to the establishment of legal limits on the King’s power, 
including new limits on the pardon power. In 1689, Parliament enacted the 
English Bill of Rights. Among other things, the Bill of Rights provided that 
the King could not suspend laws adopted by Parliament. One implication 
was that any restriction already in force was now binding and could not be 
set aside by the King ruling “non-obstante.” As a result, the King could no 
longer suspend the old Pardon Act’s specificity requirement for murder, 
rape, and treason.72 Thus, the Bill of Rights “had an indirect effect [on 
pardon power] when it prohibited the granting of dispensations, that is, by 
                                                                                                                     
66 Evans, supra note 55, at 134–35. 
67 Id. 
68 4 CHARLES KNIGHT, THE POPULAR HISTORY OF ENGLAND 208 (New York, John Wurtele Lovell 
1st ed. 1880) (discussing religious beliefs of Charles and his brother, James); JOHN MILLER, JAMES II 
57–58 (2000) (discussing James’ religious beliefs).  
69 TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720, at 1–3 
(2007). 
70 Until that point, the Catholic sympathies of King Charles and King James seemed a speculative 
threat to the Protestant majority. Had Queen Mary died without a son, King Charles’ eldest sister, Mary 
Stuart, would have been handed the Crown. Mary was a Protestant, as well as wife of William of Orange. 
With James’ birth, it was clear that a Catholic line of Kings was now possible. See id. at 271–72. 
71 Id. at 321. 
72 This was but one part of the English Bill of Rights’ limitations on the King’s power. The Act also 
barred the King from, among other things, “levying money [i.e. taxes] . . . without grant of parliament,” 
“raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace,” and interfering with the 
“election of members of parliament.” An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and 
Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, 7 (Eng.).  
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declaring it illegal for the Crown to claim . . . the right to disregard the law 
in the execution of a particular case.”73   
The Bill of Rights also meant that binding restrictions could be imposed 
upon the King by Parliament or judicial decision. In 1701, Parliament passed 
the Act of Settlement, which revisited the issue raised in the Danby case: 
whether the King had the power to pardon an official in an impeachment 
hearing. The Act of Settlement explicitly declared that pardons could not be 
made to insulate an official from being removed from office through 
impeachment. The King could still issue a pardon to insulate the impeached 
minister from any criminal penalties that might be imposed during the 
proceeding, but that would be the extent of his powers.74 Thus, if a pardon 
was granted, the official would lose his position but not his liberty.   
D. The Specificity Requirement and the Common Law 
The Act of Settlement was a substantive restriction on the pardon power, 
in that it excluded a category of cases—impeachment rulings—from the 
reach of the pardon power. But other “procedural” restrictions were also 
recognized. Identifying the nature of these restrictions is not as easily 
described, since the restrictions were not incorporated into a statute. Rather, 
the scope of the pardon power can only be identified through a careful 
reading of what John Yoo has called the “English Constitution.” That 
Constitution, of course, was not written down, but was comprised “of a 
series of unwritten principles, expressed in practice, statutes, and 
understandings” that existed at the time.75   
The Framers, in assessing the scope of the pardon power, would have 
referred to this body of law. Specifically, they would have looked to leading 
legal authorities of the common law to provide insight into the nature of 
those procedural restrictions. The legal rules distilled from these authorities 
would thus have “formed the context within which the Framers would have 
understood the new Constitution.”76   
                                                                                                                     
73 Grupp, supra note 9, at 57. 
74 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 535 (“[I]n 1700 the act of settlement . . . declared ‘that no 
pardon under the great seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.’ 
. . . [But there] is no doubt that the king can pardon after sentence on an impeachment.”); THOMAS PITT 
TASWELL-LANGMEAD & CHARLES HENRY EDWARD CARMICHAEL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 529 (London, Stevens & Haynes 3d 
ed. 1886) (“The Act of Settlement . . . declared ‘that no pardon under the Great Seal of England shall be 
pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.’ The right of the Crown to reprieve or 
pardon after sentence, remains, however, unaffected.”); Duker, supra note 9, at 503 n.152 (“In English 
law, although the king could not pardon to block an impeachment, he could pardon subsequent to 
impeachment and conviction.”); Grupp, supra note 9, at 57 (“In 1701 the Act of Settlement prohibited 
the use of pardon in cases of impeachment although it did not prohibit its use after the impeachment had 
been heard.”).  
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Several notable authorities discussed the common law of pardons in the 
early eighteenth century in some depth. Of these, the most notable was 
William Blackstone, the most influential authority on the common law at 
this time.77 Blackstone lived from 1723 until 1780 and published his classic 
work, the Commentaries, in the decades before the Constitution was 
adopted.78 The Framers were deeply familiar with his work, and key 
members of the Constitutional Convention were known to have copies of the 
Commentaries in their immediate possession. Among political writings in 
America during the founding period, Blackstone was far and away the most 
frequently cited authority on the common law.79 He was also among the most 
cited common law authorities in the Supreme Court’s major decisions 
interpreting the scope of the Pardon Clause.80 
In the Commentaries, Blackstone offers a clear statement about the 
necessity of naming the particular offense to be pardoned. As he wrote: 
“General words have . . . a very imperfect effect in pardons. A pardon of all 
felonies will not pardon a conviction . . . (for it is presumed the King knew 
not of those proceedings,) but the conviction . . . must be particularly 
mentioned.”81 Blackstone’s statement is broad, and it lists no exceptions. It 
applies to convictions of all felonies and not simply the most serious crimes 
mentioned in the Pardon Act of 1389.82 
                                                                                                                     
77 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (“Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as 
the most satisfactory expression of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work 
had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were 
familiar with it.”); see also YOO, supra note 33, at 312 n.16 (“Blackstone’s Commentaries had great 
appeal for the founding generation as the authoritative treatise on many areas of law.”) (citing GORDON 
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 10 (1969)).   
78 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1765). 
79 Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century 
American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 (1984). The only other common law 
authority in the top ten is Edward Coke (at number ten), who wrote in the seventeenth century, before 
the Glorious Revolution. Id. Among all Enlightenment thinkers mentioned in these political writings, 
Blackstone is ranked second, trailing close behind Montesquieu. Id. 
80 See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111–12 (1925); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 
69 (1904); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 n.52 (1866); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
307, 311 (1855); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162–63 (1833). 
81 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *393 (1769). 
82 The Pardon Act of 1389, however, is still operational in one respect. As noted earlier, see supra 
text accompanying note 41, the Pardon Act requires the King not only to specify the offense being 
pardoned but, at least for murder, to describe the specific way it was carried out. Blackstone clearly 
recognized this feature of the Pardon Act. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400 (“[N]o pardon for 
treason, murder, or rape shall be allowed unless the offence be particularly specified therein; and 
particularly in murder it shall be expressed whether it was committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice 
prepense.”). This feature of the Pardon Act does not appear to have been repealed. As a result, after the 
English Bill of Rights was adopted, it was binding on the King. In this way, the specificity requirement 
was actually two-tiered. For ordinary felonies, the King must specify the particular crime being pardoned. 
For the more serious crime of murder, and possibly treason or rape, a “super-particularity” requirement 
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Blackstone may be the most influential common law authority of the 
eighteenth century, but he is not the sole authority of note. Another was 
William Hawkins (1673-1746), who published his major work, Pleas of the 
Crown, in 1716.83 Like Blackstone, Hawkins recognized the existence of a 
specificity requirement. “It seems to be taken for granted,” he wrote, that a 
pardon can be issued for “all Felonies in general, without describing any one 
particular Felony.”84 But such a belief, Hawkins continues, is in error, for: 
“[I]t hath been holden that the pardon of one who is convicted by verdict of 
a felony is not good, unless it recite the indictment and conviction.”85 
Other lesser-known authorities on the common law published works in 
the eighteenth century, which also affirmed that the King must specify the 
offense pardoned. For example, Jacob Giles published his major work, the 
Student’s Companion: Or, The Reason of the Laws of England, in 1725.  
There, Giles acknowledged that, for the grant of mercy to be valid, “[t]he 
offense is to be specified in pardons.”86 Thomas Wood’s treatise, An Institute 
of the Laws of England, went through ten editions between 1720 (when it 
was first published) and 1774.87 In that work, he wrote that, “A general 
pardon of all murders, robberies, etc. to one indicted and convicted of 
murder, robbery, etc. is not good, without recital of the indictment and 
conviction. For it shall be intended that the King knew not of that 
conviction.”88 The bottom line is that, according to leading authorities at the 
                                                                                                                     
applied. The King not only had to specify the crimes to be pardoned, he also had to specify the general 
way in which the crimes were carried out.    
83 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR A SYSTEM OF THE 
PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS (1716). 
Like Blackstone, Hawkins was one of the most frequently cited common law authorities in Supreme 
Court decisions on the scope of the Pardon Clause. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925); 
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 n.52 (1866); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311–
12 (1855); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161–62 (1833). 
84 1 HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 383. Note that here and elsewhere I have corrected common law 
spelling and capitalization to conform with modern usage (e.g., I have changed “f” to “s” where 
appropriate). 
85 Id.  
86 GILES JACOB, THE STUDENT’S COMPANION: OR, THE REASON OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 
(1725) (“The King, by the Common Law, had Power to Pardon all Offences; but this Power hath been 
restrained by Statute, particularly in Cases of Murder. He may still Pardon Treason, Felony, 
Manslaughter, Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Fines and Forfeitures incurr’d by such Offences; And the 
King may also Restore Corruption of Blood to the Family of the Offenders, by his Act of Pardon. But in 
Cases of Wilful Murder, to Pardon an Offender is contrary to the Laws of God and Man; And where an 
Appeal may be brought by the Subject, by the Laws of England, a Murderer could never be Pardon’d.”). 
Interestingly, Jacob concludes that in the case of homicide, the King is absolutely barred from 
pardoning murder absent a showing of self-defense or accident (i.e., it is not sufficient to specify with 
particularity how the murder occurred). See id. (“Our Statutes enjoin that no Charter of Pardon be Granted 
for Murder, but only where one Killeth another in his own Defence, or by Misadventure.”). 
87 All citations here are to the Fourth Edition (corrected), which was published in 1724. THOMAS 
WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (J. Watts corrected ed. 1724). 
88 Id. at 636. Elsewhere, he makes the seemingly contradictory claim the King may, under some 
circumstances, issue general pardons. See id. at 637 (“Pardons . . . are either General or Particular. 
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time, a specificity requirement existed in the common law. As a result, 
pardons that failed to specify the applicable offenses were deemed invalid.     
On what basis was the specificity requirement adopted? The common 
law authorities were not always clear on the matter. One factor, certainly, 
was the historical practice at the time. As Hawkins noted, vague and general 
pardons were exceedingly rare in the common law. Those issued were either 
of older origin, or made by an Act of Parliament, not the King.89 
Legal practice alone, however, did not ground the specificity 
requirement. The requirement was seen, in part, as a natural extension of 
rules designed to curb the accidental or abusive use of pardons.90 Most 
obviously, it was a direct extension of the Pardon Act of 1389 itself. That 
Act, recall, required the King to announce when he was pardoning a serious 
crime, like murder.91 The rule was understood to serve a deterrence goal; it 
would dissuade the King from issuing pardons for illicit or improper 
motives.92 Of course, the Pardon Act was limited in scope: it applied only to 
                                                                                                                     
General, either by the Act of Parliament or By Charter of the King.”). But that statement can be reconciled 
with the ban on vague pardons by construing the support for general pardons to apply only to preemptive 
pardons—pardons made before indictment. See id. at 636 (“But if the Party is neither indicted or 
Attainted, A Pardon of all Felonies in General (except as the Statute of Rich. 2 above-mentioned is 
excepted) is Good.”). 
89 1 HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 384 (General pardons “have been of late Years very rarely granted 
by the Crown, without a particular Description of the Offence intended to be pardoned.”). Hawkins 
recognizes that some contrary precedents can be found in ancient collections of cases, but that these have 
been superseded by more recent practice. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN: OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER 
PROPER HEADS 535 (London, Law Booksellers and Publishers, 8th ed. 1824). Hawkins continues:  
As to the Precedents of such general Pardons in Rastal’s Entries [a collection of 
fifteenth century cases], it may be answered, that their Authority seems to be of less 
weight when compared with those many precedents of pardons in the Register, every 
one of which particularly describes the offence which is pardoned, and even those 
which relate to homicide by lunatics, or infants, or in self-defence, etc. except only 
one which pardons escapes, but expressly excepts all voluntary ones. And therefore 
where the books speak of pardons of all felonies in general as good, perhaps it may 
be reasonable for the most part to intend that they either speak of a pardon by 
parliament, or that they suppose that the particular crime is mentioned in the pardon, 
though they do not express it. 
Id. 
90 Deterring the accidental and abusive employment of pardons has long been seen as the core goal 
of the specificity requirement. As one American court put it, there has always been a specificity 
requirement for two basic reasons: “(1) to assure that the pardon will be given effect only with respect to 
the offense intended to be pardoned, and (2) to protect the citizenry against executive irresponsibility.” 
Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 386 (Ky. 2006). 
91 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400. 
92 Blackstone, citing Coke, explained that in adopting the Pardon Act, “it was not the intention of 
the parliament that the king should ever pardon murder under these aggravations; and therefore they 
prudently laid the pardon under these restrictions, because they did not conceive it possible that the king 
would ever excuse an offence by name, which was attended with such high aggravations. And it is 
remarkable enough, that there is no precedent of a pardon in the register for any other homicide than that 
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the most serious crimes (and it was limited in its effect, since the King could 
suspend the rules).93 These limitations reflected Parliament’s limited powers 
to control the King’s authority prior to the Glorious Revolution. 
Nonetheless, as Parliament gained the upper hand over the King, it was 
natural to expand the scope of the rule. If specificity could deter abusive 
pardons for serious crimes, why not expand it to the full range of felonies? 
The specificity requirement of the eighteenth century thus strengthened the 
deterrence effect, applying the rule to all crimes, not just the most serious 
ones.   
This was not the only basis for an expanded specificity requirement. 
Under long-held common law principles, a pardon would be deemed void if 
it could be shown that the King was uninformed, misinformed, or deceived 
about the facts of a case.94 This rule reflected the basic idea that only a 
pardon given intentionally, with full knowledge of the circumstances, is 
valid.95   
A broad specificity requirement was seen as a useful prophylactic rule 
to counter the danger of an unintentional pardon. A vague, non-specific 
pardon, for example, might be employed to vacate crimes that were not 
within the King’s contemplation or intent. Thus, in defending the specificity 
requirement, Hawkins wrote, “where the king in truth intends only to pardon 
one felony, which may be very proper for his mercy, he may by consequence 
pardon the greatest number of the most heinous crimes, the least of which, 
had he been apprised of it, he would not have pardoned.”96 To avoid the 
danger of unintended pardons, a royal decree of mercy must be construed 
narrowly.97 It must be limited to crimes expressly mentioned in the pardon.98 
                                                                                                                     
which happens se defendendo [in self-defense] or per infortunium [by accident] . . . .” Id. at *400–01. 
93 Id. at *400. 
94 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400 (“[I]t is a general rule that wherever it may reasonably 
be presumed the king is deceived, the pardon is void. Therefore any suppression of truth, or suggestion 
of falsehood, in a charter of pardon will vitiate the whole; for the king was misinformed.”); 2 HAWKINS, 
supra note 89, at 557 (It “be agreed, That if it appears from the recital of a pardon, that the king was 
misinformed either as to the nature of the case, or the proceedings thereupon, the pardon is void; as where 
the king pardons a man for felony whereof he stands indicted, or indicted and attainted, and in truth he 
never was indicted . . . .”). 
95 See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 89, at 542 (“It seems to be laid down as a general rule in many books, 
that wherever it may be reasonably intended that the king, when he granted such pardon, was not fully . 
. . apprised both of the heinousness of the crime, and also how far the party stands convicted thereof upon 
record, the pardon is void, as being gained by imposition upon the king.”). 
96 Id. at 543.  
97 Hawkins made clear that the specificity requirement was grounded on this rule against 
uninformed pardons. As he writes, any claim that general pardons are permissible is not “easy to reconcile 
with the general rules concerning pardons, agreed to be good in other cases; for if a felony cannot be well 
pardoned where it may be reasonably intended that the king, when he granted the pardon, was not fully 
apprised of the state of the case, much less doth it seem reasonable that it should be pardoned where it 
may be well intended that he was not apprised of it at all.” Id. at 534. 
98 See id. at 535 (“It seems a settled rule, that no pardon of felony shall be carried farther than the 
express purport of it . . . .”). 
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The specificity requirement, in short, advanced goals already embedded 
in the common law—goals designed to reduce the number of abusive and 
accidental pardons issued by the King. Those goals existed in limited form 
in the common law prior to the eighteenth century, reflecting the King’s 
dominant position in English society during that time. But as the King’s 
power declined, the dangers of an unfettered pardon power could be more 
openly addressed. Rather than a kingly prerogative, the pardon power could 
be seen as an extraordinary remedy that posed a danger to the public interest 
by its careless or, worse, abusive employment. An expansive specificity 
requirement was one key remedy, and it applied to all felonies without 
exception.99  
E. The Common Law and the Constitution 
The common law provides strong support for a specificity requirement, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s originalist approach to the pardon 
power. But support for the requirement is further buttressed by the 
recognition that the pardon power sits awkwardly within America’s 
constitutional scheme. Without appropriate limitations, the pardon power 
conflicts with democratic values, rule of law principles, and due process 
concerns that lie at the heart of the constitutional order.  
The tension with democratic values is plain. The American revolution 
represented a decisive break with monarchy.100 The ultimate source of 
authority in the new nation would be the people, not the King. Pardons, in 
this context, are out of place, authorizing the executive to override the will 
of the people. As one author explained, “[i]n a monarchy, a crime is a crime 
against the King, who alone has the power to pardon. But in a democracy, a 
crime offends against the people. Who can pardon a crime, then, except the 
people themselves?”101 It is precisely for this reason that many early and 
influential commentators, including Montesquieu and Blackstone, raised 
questions about the compatibility of the pardon power with democracy.102 
                                                                                                                     
99 Of course, in assessing the common law, nothing is entirely free from doubt. The precise meaning 
of terms is not always clear to us, and at least one case from immediately before the Glorious Revolution 
suggests that non-specific pardons might be sufficient. See Dominus Rex & Brownfield, Pardon, in 84 
THE ENGLISH REPORTS: KING’S BENCH DIVISION 853 (Edinburgh, William Green & Sons 1908) (1685) 
(“The Court . . . conceived that a general pardon of all felonies and burglaris . . . is sufficient, without 
particular recital of the indictment, which was mistaken . . . and the pardon was allowed.”). But the vast 
weight of opinion—including leading writers like Blackstone and Hawkins—indicates that a specificity 
requirement existed in the common law at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. 
100 See, e.g., 1 THOMAS PAINE, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 70 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 
New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) (“But where, say some, is the King of America? I’ll tell you, 
friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Great Britain. . . . 
For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there 
ought to be no other.” (emphasis added)). 
101 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 24 (1997). 
102 For example, William Blackstone wrote that, “In democracies, . . . this point of pardon can never 
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Beyond its potentially undemocratic features, an unfettered pardon 
power also conflicts with rule of law values. Those values require laws to be 
publicly articulated, clearly defined, and applied consistently across society. 
An unregulated pardon power undermines these goals. As one commentator 
put it, such a power represents not so much discretionary justice, but justice 
in “derogation of law.”103 The danger of an unchecked discretionary power 
would have been plain to the Framers, who fought to counter the arbitrary 
or abusive power of English Kings. 
Finally, and more narrowly, vaguely-drafted pardons undermine due 
process principles. As the Supreme Court has indicated, acceptance of a 
pardon represents the acknowledgement of guilt.104 In ordinary criminal 
cases, due process requires the defendant to know the crimes he is pleading 
guilty to. Thus, a court will refuse to accept a guilty plea without making 
sure “the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge” and the consequences of the plea.105 The same principle extends to 
pardon cases. A defendant must know the specific crimes he is admitting to 
when utilizing a pardon.  
These concerns illustrate the anomalous position that the pardon power 
has in our constitutional scheme. This is not to conclude that pardons are 
without all justification. The Framers understood that pardons could be 
employed for public-spirited purposes, to grant mercy to deserving offenders 
or to mitigate the harsh consequences of criminal laws.106 It is for these 
reasons that the Constitution grants the President authority to issue pardons 
in the first place. But the tension with democratic, rule of law, and due 
process principles means that pardons are properly seen as extraordinary 
                                                                                                                     
subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the laws: and it 
would be impolitic for the power of judging and of pardoning to centre in one and the same person.” 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *397. Montesquieu, one of the most influential theorists of the founding 
period, made a similar point. See MOORE, supra note 101, at 24 (“In France, for example, Montesquieu 
made it clear that he had no objection to pardons in principle. In fact, they could be useful as a way of 
making the punishment fit the particular crime. But in a republic, Montesquieu declared, there could be 
no pardon.”). Montesquieu was the most cited theorist among the Framers during the period leading up 
to the constitutional debates. See Lutz, supra note 79, at 193 (listing Montesquieu as the most cited 
political theorist among those mentioned in the Framers’ writings). 
 103 As one treatise author wrote, “Pardons, being in derogation of law, to be valid and of effect 
must accurately describe the offense intended to be forgiven.” RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 548.  
104 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915). See also 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 228 (1865) 
(“There can be no pardon where there is no actual or imputed guilt. The acceptance of a pardon is a 
confession of guilt, or of the existence of a state of facts from which a judgment of guilt would follow.”). 
105 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 n.3 (1970) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11) (“The 
court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea . . . without first addressing the 
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature 
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”). 
106 The Framers certainly understood the benefit of mercy in select cases. Alexander Hamilton 
emphasized that ameliorating the harshness of the laws was one argument for the pardon power; the need 
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remedies. It also means that modest rules that can help counter abusive, 
haphazard, and unintentional pardons are fully consistent with this 
constitutional structure.  
In this regard, the specificity requirement is a well-tailored tool for 
mitigating the most problematic features of the pardon power, while 
preserving a broad sphere for the exercise of executive discretion. As a 
preliminary matter, the requirement does not establish substantive 
limitations on the kinds of offenders or the types of crimes that might be 
pardoned, thereby leaving a wide field for the President. At the same time, 
the requirement helps to counteract some of the worst excesses of the power.  
By requiring the President to identify the specific offenses pardoned, the 
requirement advances democratic values by providing the public and the 
political branches with critical information needed to evaluate the propriety 
of the pardon. The requirement promotes due process values by ensuring 
that defendants know what they are confessing to. And it promotes rule of 
law values by deterring the haphazard or abusive use of executive power. 
The requirement is, thus, carefully structured to advance constitutional 
values, without interfering with the pardon power’s more benign goals.107  
III. OBJECTIONS 
The argument in support of a specificity requirement has been grounded 
on a careful reading of the common law and the Constitution’s core values. 
The argument, however, potentially faces two objections—one based on the 
text of the Constitution, the other based on historical practice. Both warrant 
careful attention. 
                                                                                                                     
107 One counterargument is that the Framers adopted a different remedy for abusive pardons—
impeachment. Unlike the King of England, an American President can be removed from office if he 
misuses the pardon power. Given the availability of presidential impeachment, this argument goes, 
additional curbs are unnecessary. This argument, which might be superficially plausible, is ultimately 
unpersuasive.   
As a preliminary matter, there is no evidence that the Framers wanted impeachment to override the 
common law’s prophylactic requirement. Given the Supreme Court’s repeated statements that the pardon 
power incorporates common law limitations, one would expect some indication from the drafters that 
they intended to override the specificity requirement. There is no such evidence. Rather, the similarities 
in language between the English Act of Settlement and the Constitution’s Pardon Clause suggests that 
the Framers sought to mirror British law and practice, not abolish common law limitations sub silentio. 
See Duker, supra note 9, at 501 (noting similarities in language).   
Moreover, it is misguided to view impeachment as a substitute for the specificity requirement. 
Impeachment is an extreme remedy. It may deter Presidents from using the pardon power in the most 
egregious situations, but it does not address lesser misuses of the pardon power, nor does it address the 
danger that a broad, vaguely-worded pardon might apply beyond the President’s intent. Most importantly, 
the specificity requirement, rather than conflicting with the impeachment mechanism, actually supports 
it. Since impeachment is principally a political remedy, it requires some ability for the political branches 
to police the executive. Transparency promotes that goal in publicity function. By exposing the scope of 
the pardon, the political branches can see what is being pardoned and can act accordingly.   
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A. The Textual Objection 
The first objection focuses on the language of the Pardon Clause itself. 
According to various commentators, the text of the Constitution reveals only 
two limitations: pardons cannot be used in impeachment cases or in state 
prosecutions. By identifying these two restrictions in the text, the Framers 
implied that none other exists. As John Yoo and Saikrishna Prakash affirm, 
the “text shows that the Framers knew how to make exceptions to the pardon 
power,” and if they meant to impose any additional constraints, the Framers 
would have done so in the text.108 
This argument faces several problems. The first is that it rests on a rule 
of statutory construction that is not a firm rule at all. The principle, called 
“expressio unius” in Latin, stands for the proposition that the expression of 
one thing suggests the exclusion of others. Thus, according to that rule, if 
two exceptions are listed in the text, the Framers intended no other 
limitations to apply. 
The initial difficulty, as David Golove, has put it, is that “drawing the 
expressio unius inference can be a risky venture. In constitutional 
adjudication, the Court has sometimes applied the canon, but it has often 
explicitly rejected it.”109 Numerous other theorists have made similar 
points.110 Perhaps the most famous is Alexander Hamilton, who warned 
against using the maxim in an unthinking manner.111 
More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
textual limitations were not intended to eliminate other “implicit” limits on 
the pardon power, including common law limits.112 To believe otherwise, 
                                                                                                                     
108 John Yoo & Saikrishna Prakash, For Trump, Self-Pardon Would Equal Self-Immolation, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (July 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www2.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/for-trump-
self-pardon-would-equal-self-immolation-20170727.html.   
109 David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1815–16 (1998) 
(footnotes omitted). As Golove points out, numerous Supreme Court cases have rejected the rigid 
application of the rule. See id. at 1815 n.85 (collecting cases). 
110 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 653–
54 n.30 (1996) (“[T]he expressio unius maxim of inference by negative implication must be applied 
sensitively and contextually; sometimes a negative implication makes the most sense of a clause, 
sometimes not.”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or 
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 237 n.99 
(1945) (“The general view has been that the maxim of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
has no validity as a canon of constitutional construction.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 
1273 (1995) (noting limitations of statutory rule). 
111 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (affirming maxim should only be used when 
reason and common sense suggest it is appropriate). 
112 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 263–64 (1974) (“In light of the English common law from 
which such language was drawn, the conclusion is inescapable that the pardoning power was intended to 
include the power to commute sentences on conditions which do not in themselves offend the 
Constitution, but which are not specifically provided for by statute.”). 
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one would have to reject the Supreme Court’s repeated statements that the 
Pardon Clause should be interpreted in light of common law practice.113  
Ex parte Grossman offers one of the clearest statements to this effect. 
After discussing the English origins of the Pardon Clause, the Court affirmed 
the continuing validity of common law limits: 
We have given the history of the clause to show that the words 
“for offences against the United States” were inserted by a 
Committee on Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon 
of the President was to operate upon offenses against the 
United States as distinguished from offenses against the 
States. It cannot be supposed that the Committee on Revision 
by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them, 
intended sub silentio to narrow the scope of a pardon from one 
at common law or to confer any different power in this regard 
on our Executive from that which the members of the 
Convention had seen exercised before the Revolution.114 
Moreover, application of expressio unius would run contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent,115 which has identified various implicit limitations on the 
Pardon Clause, including rules that a pardon must be accepted and then 
pleaded to be valid.116 
                                                                                                                     
113 See, e.g., id. at 262 (“The history of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent pattern 
of adherence to the English common-law practice.”); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 112 (1925) 
(discussing the “authoritative background of the common law”). 
114 Grossman, 267 U.S. at 113. The rest of the Court’s statement here deserves mention as well:  
Nor is there any substance in the contention that there is any substantial difference in 
this matter between the executive power of pardon in our Government and the King’s 
prerogative. The courts of Great Britain were called the King’s Courts, as indeed they 
were; but for years before our Constitution they were as independent of the King’s 
interference as they are today. The extent of the King’s pardon was clearly 
circumscribed by law and the British Constitution, as the cases cited above show. The 
framers of our Constitution had in mind no necessity for curtailing this feature of the 
King’s prerogative in transplanting it into the American governmental structures, save 
by excepting cases of impeachment; and even in that regard, as already pointed out, 
the common law forbade the pleading a pardon in bar to an impeachment. The 
suggestion that the President’s power of pardon should be regarded as necessarily less 
than that of the King was pressed upon this Court and was agreed to by Mr. Justice 
McLean, one of the dissenting Judges, in Ex parte William Wells, 18 Howard, 307, 
321, but it did not prevail with the majority. 
Id. 
115 See Clifton Williams, “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 193 
(1931) (explaining the rule of construction that “the expression of one subject, object, or idea is the 
exclusion of other subjects, objects, or ideas”).  
116 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 155–56, 161 (1833) (“[T]he court cannot give 
the prisoner the benefit of the pardon, unless he claims the benefit of it, and relies on it by plea or motion. 
. . . [A] general plea of not guilty, was equivalent to a refusal to accept it.”). 
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The Court has made it absolutely clear, in short, that the rule of statutory 
interpretation is inapplicable in the pardon context and that the pardon power 
is limited by both explicit textual restrictions and implicit common law rules. 
That view is the only one consistent with Supreme Court rulings and the text 
of the Constitution.  
One might still wonder why the Framers included several textual 
limitations rather than relying entirely on common law practices. The most 
plausible explanation is that the Framers incorporated textual limitations in 
those cases where there were questions about the applicability of common 
law rules. Consider, for example, the textual provision restricting the pardon 
power to “offenses against the United States.”117 Absent that clause, 
uncertainty would exist about the applicability of the pardon power to state 
crimes, and reliance on the common law would yield no clear answer. The 
English system, after all, did not have a similarly structured federal system.  
Given that potential ambiguity, the Framers quite reasonably concluded 
that a specific textual limitation would be needed to make clear that the 
pardon power did not extend to state crimes. Doing so did not signify a desire 
to preempt the common law; it simply reflected the realization that the 
common law was silent or ambiguous in this area.  
A similar issue arises in the case of pardons during impeachment 
proceedings. Once again, without a textual limitation, the Pardon Clause 
would be unclear.118 The text would simply read: “The President shall have 
the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United 
States.”119 The text, at least on one reading, would not prohibit the use of 
pardons in impeachment cases. True, the common law has something to say 
about this matter. The Act of Settlement bars the use of pardons to prevent 
an official’s removal from office during impeachments.120 But the Act of 
Settlement does not prohibit the use of pardons during impeachment cases 
entirely. As noted earlier, the Act still permits the King to issue a pardon to 
                                                                                                                     
117 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
118 Id. (“[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” (emphasis added)). 
119 Id. 
120 Act of Settlement 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
aep/Will3/12-13/2 (“That no Pardon under the Great Seal of England be pleadable to an Impeachment 
by the Commons in Parliament.”). 
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vacate criminal penalties issued during impeachments, but pardons could not 
be used to bar removal from office.121  
This nuanced common law rule reflected a unique feature of English 
impeachments. Those proceedings could result, not just to an official’s 
removal from office, but in additional criminal penalties as well.122 This is 
quite different from the American system, where impeachments can only 
result in the removal from office (i.e., criminal penalties could not be 
authorized).123  
Absent specific guidance in the text of the Constitution, one might 
plausibly contend that the common law rule did not apply to the American 
scheme, given the different outcomes in English and American 
impeachment proceedings. As a result, without a textual limit, the 
Constitution could be read to authorize the President to issue pardons in 
impeachment cases.  
This may not be the most persuasive reading of how the Act of 
Settlement applies to the constitutional scheme. But it is at least a plausible 
reading. Given the potential for confusion, it made sense for the Framers to 
include explicit textual guidance in Article II about the validity of pardons 
in impeachment cases.  
                                                                                                                     
 121 The unique features of the royal pardon power were plainly understood by the Framers and were 
mentioned in the debates over the Pardon Clause. Duker, supra note 9, at 501. In one of the few exchanges 
on the pardon power at the Convention, James Iredell observed that, in England, the King’s pardon “is 
not pleadable in bar of an impeachment. But he may pardon after conviction, even on an impeachment; 
which is an authority not given to our President, who in case of impeachments has no power either of 
pardoning or reprieving.” Id. at 502 (quoting PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
350–51 (P. Ford ed., 1968)).  
 The Framers took those differences into account when drafting the Pardon Clause. Id. Initially, the 
Pardon Clause mirrored the language of the English Act of Settlement, in stating that a pardon “shall not 
be pleadable in bar of an impeachment.” Id. at 501. The language made sense in the English system, 
where impeachment proceedings could lead to both removal from office and criminal penalties. Id. at 
503. The Act of Settlement language suggested that a pardon could not insulate an offender from removal 
by impeachment, but it could protect him from criminal penalties. Id. at 496.  
 In the American system, impeachment proceedings resulted only in removal from office. See id. at 
503 (“In England, impeachment extend[ed] not only to removal from office but also to the more severe 
forms of punishment.”). Thus, the Framers could say categorically that pardons were not available in 
impeachment cases. And that is the way the Pardon Clause ultimately read, affirming that pardons were 
permitted, “except for impeachment.” See id. at 503 n.152 (“It was the more lenient extent of the 
impeachment power in America that motivated the insertion of the word ‘except’ for the phrase ‘in bar 
of’ . . . .”). The Supreme Court later observed that, while the Pardon Clause is based on the Act of 
Settlement, it “is an improvement upon the same.” Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 312 (1856). 
122 Duker, supra note 9, at 503. The Danby affair was an illustration of that power; in that case, 
Parliament voted both to remove Danby from office and to impose criminal penalties upon him. Id. at 
487–96. 
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than 
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under 
the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”). Criminal penalties, thus, could not be imposed as part 
of the impeachment proceeding, though they could be imposed in a separate criminal prosecution. Id. 
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That explicit language did not signify that the Framers meant to exclude 
common law rules. It simply meant that, in situations where the common 
law was uncertain, the Framers understood it would be prudent to include 
textual guidance. In other cases, where the relevance of common law rules 
was clear, the Framers expected those rules to be incorporated into the text 
of the pardon power without qualification.124  
B. The Objection from Historical Practice 
The second objection takes a different form, focusing on arguments 
from historical practice. Here the claim is that Presidents have repeatedly 
issued non-specific pardons throughout American history. That practice, the 
argument goes, justifies a new constitutional rule that overrides the original 
meaning of the Pardon Clause.  
The argument from historical practice is not frivolous on its face. Case 
law supports the idea that historical practice is a relevant factor when 
interpreting the Constitution in certain kinds of cases—particularly in 
separation of powers cases.125 In these situations, a longstanding, 
unchallenged practice deserves deference, since it signifies the existence of 
a consensus view about the appropriate distribution of power.126 That 
doctrine certainly seems relevant here, given that the pardon power almost 
certainly implicates separation of powers concerns.127 
                                                                                                                     
124 Duker, supra note 9, at 529. This interpretation gains further credibility when one considers 
what the Framers would have needed to do to achieve the same results had the expressio unius rule of 
statutory interpretation applied. Namely, they would have had to specify the relevant common law rules 
in a comprehensive manner. The result would have been a long, unwieldy provision that would have run 
counter to their aspiration to draft a Constitution with a concise statement of governing principles. The 
choice they made—to rely on common law principles with clarifying textual rules—was eminently 
reasonable. 
125 This view can be traced back to the earliest Supreme Court cases: In McCulloch v. Maryland, 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that, “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause and 
human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned, 
but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; 
if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that 
practice.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Recent separation of powers cases have relied—to greater 
or lesser extent—on constitutional practice. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) 
(quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014)) (discussing separation of powers); Noel 
Canning, 573 U.S. at 514 (“[I]n interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon historical 
practice. For one thing, the interpretive questions before us concern the allocation of power between two 
elected branches of Government.”). 
126 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“The separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to undefined provisions in 
the frame of our government. . . . The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore, the way 
the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature. 
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or 
legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”). 
127 The pardon power, after all, gives the President the authority to suspend or override 
congressional rules, serving as a check on excessively punitive legislation. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
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This is not to say that the historical practice argument is successful. As 
a preliminary matter, this kind of argument is not typically decisive. Where 
constitutional commands are clear—either because the text or original intent 
of the Framers is plain—historical practice does not control. As the Court 
has said, “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.”128 Thus, 
historical practice “should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision” alone.129  
That is one reason why historical practice arguments are so common in 
separation of powers cases. In many of those cases, the Court is called upon 
to assess the distribution of authority among the various branches without 
clear constitutional guidance. But this also highlights why historical practice 
arguments are less relevant in assessing the specificity requirement. Here, 
after all, the Framers’ intent is clear: a specificity requirement exists, 
grounded in common law practices. As a result, historical practice cannot 
justify a new constitutional rule contrary to the Framers’ intent.130   
This conclusion suggests courts should give little or no weight to 
historical practice when considering the validity of the specificity 
requirement. Yet even if such evidence were deemed relevant, historical 
practice would offer no basis for rejecting the specificity requirement. This 
is so for two independent and fundamental reasons. First, a close look at the 
evidence reveals that, in fact, a deeply entrenched historical practice does 
                                                                                                                     
Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 829–33 (2015) 
(“The Framers and contemporary scholars have also seen the clemency power as a key part of the 
separation of powers because it allows the executive to check the legislative and judicial branches.”). 
The separation of powers implications of the pardon power are touched upon in the Federalist Papers. 
Alexander Hamilton notes in Federalist 74 that: “The criminal code of every country partakes so much 
of necessary severity that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would 
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). Even the 
most refined statutory code, in other words, requires a safety valve to account for exceptional cases. 
Even more directly relevant, in at least one case the Supreme Court discussed historical practice 
when interpreting the scope of the pardon power. Thus, in Ex parte Grossman, the Court ruled that the 
President has the constitutional power to pardon criminal contempts. 267 U.S. 87, 122 (1925). Such a 
rule, the Court suggested, was supported, in part, by historical practice. Id. at 118 (“[C]riminal contempts 
of a federal court have been pardoned for eighty-five years. In that time the power has been exercised 
twenty-seven times.”). 
128 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); see also Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–
73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (standing for the same proposition). The Supreme Court has stated in a 
different context, the fact “that an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render 
that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 
(1969); see also Duker, supra note 9, at 524 (restating the holding from Powell). 
129 Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–73 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
130 The Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman is not to the contrary. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 
112-13. In Grossman, the Supreme Court relied on historical practice to rule in support of the President’s 
authority to pardon contempt. But in that case, the common law and other interpretive tools supported 
the conclusion that the President can pardon for contempt. Thus, historical practice was not utilized to 
override a clear constitutional rule; it was used as further support for a rule validated by other interpretive 
factors, including original intent. 
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not exist in support of non-specific pardons. Second, even if such a practice 
did exist, it should be discounted because of certain unique features relevant 
to the pardon process. 
1. No Historical Practice Exists for Non-Specific Pardons 
Is there a historical practice in support of vague pardons? That one might 
believe the answer is “yes” might not be surprising. After all, the most 
famous pardon in recent memory was President Ford’s pardon of Richard 
Nixon, which directly violated the specificity requirement. That pardon 
absolved Nixon of guilt “for all offenses against the United States which he 
. . . has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period 
from January 20, 1969 through September 8, 1974.”131  
The memory of that pardon might persuade citizens to believe that vague 
pardons are a common occurrence. But such an inference would be a 
mistake, representing what cognitive theorists call the “availability bias.”132 
When certain events are more easily brought to mind, human beings tend to 
overestimate their prevalence.133 In fact, President Ford’s vague pardon was 
an exceptional occurrence, not a common event.   
A review of pardons during the last eight presidential administrations 
makes this clear. Between 1974 and 2018, a total of 2191 pardons were 
issued.134 Of these, President Ford’s pardon of Nixon was only one of two 
pardon orders that potentially violated the specificity requirement. The other 
occurred on Christmas Eve of 1992, when President George H.W. Bush 
issued an executive order that pardoned members involved in the 
Iran-Contra affair. The group included four individuals who were pardoned 
after being convicted (Elliott Abrams, Alan Fiers, Clair George, and Robert 
C. McFarlane) and two others who were pardoned after indictment but 
before trial (Duane R. Clarridge and Caspar W. Weinberger). 
That pardon was written in an unusual manner. It gave a full, complete, 
and unconditional pardon to the six defendants “for all offenses charged or 
prosecuted by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh or committed by 
these individuals and within the jurisdiction of that office.”135 The 
non-italicized portion of this language is fully consistent with the specificity 
                                                                                                                     
131 Proclamation No. 4311, supra note 7. 
132 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 424 (2011). 
133 For a concise discussion of this cognitive bias, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of 
Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 552–56 (2013) and Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127–28 
(1974). 
134 Clemency Statistics, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last 
updated July 11, 2019). These include pardons granted by Presidents Ford (382 pardons), Carter (534), 
Reagan (393), Bush (74), Clinton (396), G.W. Bush (189), Obama (212), and Trump (10, through Aug. 
1, 2019).  
135 Proclamation No. 6518, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2382 (Dec. 24, 1992) (emphasis added).  
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requirement, since it limits the pardon to crimes outlined in the indictments 
and convictions. But the italicized portion is a different matter. This phrase 
encompasses any crime that the special prosecutor might charge within his 
jurisdiction in the future. In failing to define the kinds of crimes that might 
be pardoned, the language arguably violates the specificity requirement.136   
With the Iran-Contra pardons added in, the total number of vague 
pardons would still remain vanishingly small. It would mean that, over 
forty-four years, seven out of 2191 pardons were problematic.137 That comes 
out to .3% over the period.    
This number ignores one other category of presidential orders that might 
seem relevant to the analysis—general amnesties. Like pardons, amnesties 
insulate an offender from criminal liability. They differ from ordinary 
pardons in that they are issued to groups of unnamed offenders, rather than 
to select, identified individuals.138 Although the word “amnesty” is not 
                                                                                                                     
136 Whether it actually violates the specificity requirement is a matter of debate. First, the 
questionable language in the pardon is not actually operational, since the offenders had not yet been 
charged with additional crimes, and it is not clear that they could have been. Consequently, the additional 
language could be viewed as superfluous; a kind of presidential dicta. 
Second, President Bush, in issuing the pardons, couched them in terms of rewarding individuals 
who carried out hazardous foreign policy and military missions. Indeed, Bush self-consciously situated 
the pardon within a list of military amnesties, comparing his order with “James Madison’s pardon of 
Lafitte’s pirates after the War of 1812, . . . Andrew Johnson’s pardon of soldiers who had fought for the 
Confederacy, . . . [and] Harry Truman’s and Jimmy Carter’s pardons of those who violated the Selective 
Service laws in World War II and Vietnam.” See Associate Press, The Pardons; Text of President Bush’s 
Statement on the Pardon of Weinberger and Others, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1992), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/25/us/pardons-text-president-bush-s-statement-pardon-weinberger-
others.html (statement by President Bush when announcing the pardon). As discussed in more detail later 
in this Section, these kinds of military pardons or amnesties may be exempt from the specificity 
requirement.  
137 Database of pardons on file with author. Besides the 2191 pardons discussed above, we also 
have relevant information about 2314 pardons from 1961 through 1974 (spanning the administrations of 
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon). According to one study, all but three of these pardons were 
issued after conviction. See Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of 
Information, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 191 n.160 (1999) (citing A Pardon for Nixon and Watergate Is Back, 
CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 14, 1974, at 2458). For the post-conviction pardons, it is reasonable to assume 
that the President knew of the specific charges and either explicitly referred to the charges in the relevant 
indictments or at least implicitly limited the pardons to those charges. We do not know if the three 
pre-conviction pardons satisfied the specificity requirement. But even if all three were vaguely worded, 
the percentage of non-specific pardons during this period would be miniscule: .1% over the entire period. 
138 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601–02 (1896) (noting that an amnesty “is rarely, if 
ever, exercised in favor of single individuals, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, 
who are subject to trial, but have not yet been convicted”); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 
(1877) (“[T]he term [amnesty] is generally employed where pardon is extended to whole classes or 
communities, instead of individuals . . . .”); United States v. Hall, 53 F. 352, 355 (W.D. Pa. 1892) 
(“Pardons are granted to individual criminals by name; amnesty to classes of offenders or communities. 
They differ, not in kind, but solely in the number they severally affect.”); see also Samuel T. Morison, 
Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 291 (2010) (“Analytically, 
an amnesty is not really a separate form of relief under the Pardon Clause, but merely signifies a pardon 
extended to an entire class of unnamed persons falling within the specific terms of the grant, typically 
enacted by a means of a presidential proclamation, rather than a clemency warrant issued to one or more 
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mentioned in the Constitution, courts have ruled that amnesties are 
authorized under the Pardon Clause of the Constitution.139 In effect, 
amnesties are a special kind of pardon.  
Since amnesties have the same legal roots as pardons, they would seem 
relevant to our discussion of pardon practices. But including amnesties in 
the analysis does not change the conclusion. Out of a total of approximately 
thirty amnesties, twenty specify the offenses covered by the order and thus 
are fully consistent with the specificity requirement.140  Two more implicitly 
limit the scope of the pardon to specific offenses.141 Finally, one pardon was 
enacted pursuant to a treaty, thus resting on independent constitutional 
grounds.142 That leaves only seven amnesties that lack references to specific 
offenses (i.e., conflict with the specificity requirement). If all seven were 
treated as vague pardons, the total number of vague pardons would still be a 
tiny amount—a total of fourteen pardons out of 2191 (or .6%). 
At the same time, the appropriateness of looking to amnesties as a point 
of reference is questionable. Although both amnesties and individual 
pardons are rooted in the same constitutional provision, they have important 
differences.143 The most fundamental difference, for our purposes, concerns 
the kinds of offenses for which amnesties typically apply. Amnesties are 
almost always issued for offenses relating to military conflict.144 Thus, they 
                                                                                                                     
identifiable grantees.”); Henry Weihofen, Legislative Pardons: Another View, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 387, 
391 (1939) (“The difference between amnesty and pardon—‘general’ or ‘special pardon,’ if one likes—
lies . . . in the character of the act. The [pardon] remits punishment to a named person. The [amnesty] 
remits punishment for an offense, without particular reference to those who committed it.”). 
139 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 332 (1892) (Amnesties “only enable[] [the President] to do that in one 
act which he might do by a thousand. The power which the Executive exercises is still the pardoning 
power, and that the Constitution gives him.”). The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say, in dicta, that 
the “distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance.” Brown, 161 U.S. at 601; see 
also Knote, 95 U.S. at 153 (“[T]he distinction between [amnesty and pardon] is one rather of philological 
interest than of legal importance.”).    
140 See infra Appendix A.  
141 See Proclamation (Dec. 8, 1863), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 213, 213–15 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (proclamation by President 
Lincoln asserting that amnesty is limited to the crime of treason, given the preamble’s language referring 
to both treasons explicitly and to earlier statutes that identify treason as the focus of concern); 
Proclamation (May 29, 1865), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
1789-1897, supra, at 310, 310–11 (proclamation by President Andrew Johnson indicating that amnesty 
refers to and mirrors Lincoln’s earlier amnesty of December 8, 1863, and so similar limitations 
presumably apply). Cf. In re Stetler, 22 F. Cas. 1314, 1315 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1852) (No. 13,380) (showing 
that the preamble of a pardon is relevant in assessing pardon’s scope). 
142 Treaty with the Cherokees, Cherokees-U.S., art. II, Aug. 6, 1846, 9 Stat. 871.  
143 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94–95 (1915) (“They are of different character and have 
different purposes.”). For example, the Court has explained, an amnesty “overlooks the offense,” while 
“remit[ting] punishment.” Id. One possible implication is that acceptance of a pardon implies acceptance 
of guilt, while the application of an amnesty does not.   
144 Amnesty, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 37 (1930) (“[A]mnesties of a general 
nature usually follow civil disturbances which have threatened the government . . . .”); Morison, supra 
note 138, at 291 (“Presidents have utilized this mechanism of pardon relief repeatedly throughout 
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are commonly used to reconcile combatants after fighting,145 absolve a 
deserter of guilt,146 or show gratitude to soldiers who have fought in battle.147   
Amnesties of this sort directly or indirectly implicate the President’s 
Article II commander-in-chief powers. These powers lie at the very heart of 
executive authority.148 For this reason, amnesties deserve a particularly 
deferential kind of review and, arguably, should be exempted from 
procedural rules pertaining to pardons, including the rule that a pardon 
satisfy the specificity requirement.149 
Though this conclusion has never been tested in the Supreme Court, at 
least one circuit court has reached a similar conclusion, albeit perhaps for 
different reasons. In Greathouse, a federal circuit court observed that, “if a 
man be attained of felony, and get a pardon which doth not mention the 
attainder, the pardon will be ineffectual.”150 After expressing some 
skepticism about the continuing viability of such a rule, the court added that, 
regardless, the specificity requirement has no application to a proclamation 
of amnesty or general pardon to a number of offenders as a class.151 
                                                                                                                     
American history to restore social peace after periods of war and other episodes of political upheaval.”); 
Weihofen, supra note 138, at 392 (The purpose of amnesties historically “was similar to that of a treaty 
which ends hostilities between different nations when both nations retain their independence. The acts 
of amnesty ended hostilities between warring factions, when neither faction was exterminated or 
expelled.”). This distinct feature is consistent with the historic uses of the amnesty power, going back to 
classical times. See id. at 392 (Amnesties are “Act[s] of Grace” of a special sort, “its use in English 
history was precisely the same as in Greek and Roman history. It put an end to rebellion, civil war or 
disturbance, in which it was not desired to exterminate or expel all guilty persons.”). 
145 E.g., Proclamation No. 483 (July 4, 1902), reprinted in A SUPPLEMENT TO A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1902, at 392, 392–94 (George Raywood Devitt 
ed., 1903) (granting amnesty for insurrectionists in Philippines). 
146 E.g., Amnesty and Pardon, 43 Stat. 1940 (Mar. 5, 1924) (granting amnesty for certain World 
War I deserters). 
147 E.g., Proclamation No. 2676, 10 Fed. Reg. 15,409 (Dec. 24, 1945) (granting amnesty for certain 
persons active in the armed forces after July 1941). 
148 The Framers understood the heightened social interests at play in granting amnesties. In one of 
the only substantive discussions of the Pardon Clause in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
justified the President’s broad pardon powers on the grounds that a well-placed amnesty might be 
essential for avoiding internal conflict after wartime. As Hamilton wrote: “[T]he principal argument for 
reposing the power of pardoning in . . . the chief magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection and 
rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels 
may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth.” THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton); see 
also Duker, supra note 9, at 504–05 (explaining the reasoning behind the executive pardon power). 
149 The Supreme Court has recognized that different procedural rules apply to amnesties compared 
to ordinary pardons. For example, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts should take judicial notice 
of amnesties but not pardons. See Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1892) (Granting of amnesty 
to Civil War rebels is a “public proclamation of the President, which has the force of public law, and of 
which all courts and officers must take notice, whether especially called to their attention or not.”). 
150 In re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1059 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1864). 
151 Id. at 1060 (“But this reason can have no application to general acts of amnesty and pardon, 
which are intended to include whole classes of offenders, and are in no respect founded on any 
consideration of the circumstances of particular cases, except of those which by name or special 
description may be excepted out of them.”). 
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The implication is that amnesties should not be considered as part of the 
historical practice relevant to our study, at least when they are issued for 
wartime infractions. The only “amnesties” that deserve our attention are 
those issued for offenses outside the military and national security 
context.152 How many general pardons of this sort exist? Of the roughly 
thirty amnesties issued over the nation’s history, only one involves ordinary 
criminal activity.   
That amnesty occurred in 1917, when President Wilson issued amnesty 
for all individuals currently serving a suspended sentence. Those suspended 
sentences had all recently been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.153 In his amnesty proclamation, Wilson noted that returning these 
individuals to prison would lead to significant hardship and potential 
injustice, especially since many seemed to be living blameless lives.154 
Particularly relevant for our purposes is the fact that the amnesty was written 
in extremely broad language. It applied to any federal offense that generated 
a suspended sentence. In that sense, it violated the specificity requirement.    
This single example of an amnesty for ordinary criminal activity should 
be included in our list of non-specific pardons, rather than the seven 
non-specific amnesties mentioned previously. In that case, the total number 
of pardons and “amnesties” that involve non-specific offense language falls 
to eight out of 2191, or .4%. Needless to say, this is hardly a “systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued.”155 Rather, it is best described 
as exceptionally rare. 
                                                                                                                     
152 The word “amnesties” is surrounded with quotation marks in the text because the term is used 
here solely to refer to offenses relating to military conflict. Under that definition, an executive order 
absolving run-of-the-mill crimes for a class of offenders might more accurately be described as a “general 
pardon,” rather than an amnesty.   
153 See Proclamation of the President of the United States (June 14, 1917), in SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS COVERING THE SECOND TERM OF WOODROW WILSON, 
MARCH 4, 1917, TO MARCH 4, 1921, at 8318, 8318–19 (1921) (granting amnesty to persons who received 
a suspended sentence during a specified period). The amnesty was triggered by a Supreme Court 
decision, Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). The case is sometimes referred to as the Killits 
decision after the judge who imposed one of the suspended sentences. As the Court in Killits explained, 
it has long been the practice of district courts to suspend a sentence indefinitely. Id. at 50–51. Indeed, at 
the time of the Killits decision, there were in excess of two thousand persons at large on suspended 
sentences, most if not all of whom were convicted of ordinary criminal offenses. Id. at 52. Killits declared 
that this practice was illegal, and that courts lacked lawful power to suspend criminal sentences. Id. at 
51–52. The implication was that released offenders would be returned to prison.   
154 Wilson’s proclamation mirrors the Supreme Court’s own statements in Killits. As the Court 
noted, grave concerns had been raised that, as a result of its ruling, “misery and anguish and miscarriage 
of justice may come to many innocent persons” by its ruling. The Court responded by stating that a 
“complete remedy may be afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power.” Killits, 242 U.S. at 52. 
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2. Practical Obstacles to Challenging Pardons 
The flaws in the historical practice argument are even greater than these 
numbers suggest. Even if one were to conclude, counterfactually, that a large 
number of vague pardons were sprinkled throughout American history, that 
pattern would still not make the historical practice argument compelling. To 
understand this point, we need to clarify why a “systematic, unbroken, 
practice” might be relevant in constitutional interpretation.  
The standard explanation is that such a pattern suggests a consensus 
among the political branches regarding the appropriate distribution of 
government power—a consensus that deserves respect when interpreting the 
Constitution’s separation of powers requirements.156 In the pardon context, 
however, a practice cannot generate such an inference. The reason is that the 
political branches lack obvious opportunities or incentives to challenge the 
President’s pardon practices. Consequently, the failure to challenge a vague 
pardon should not imply a consensus; it may simply reflect a lack of realistic 
opportunities to push back.157 
Congress, for example, has limited options for challenging executive 
pardons. The Supreme Court has stated that pardons are entirely insulated 
from congressional control.158 Individual legislators are also powerless to 
challenge executive pardons in court, primarily because of strict standing 
rules. To bring suit, a legislator would need to “allege the deprivation of a 
legislative prerogative, such as nullification of a vote or deprivation of the 
opportunity to vote on legislative business.”159 A pardon does neither.160   
                                                                                                                     
156 See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology 
Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 880–82 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
(1995)) (The fact that Congresses have repeatedly “failed to object . . . even when [they] had an 
opportunity to do so,” creates at least an inference that the body consented to the executive action. 
(alterations in original)). 
157 One might imagine other scenarios where the opportunity to challenge a practice does not exist. 
For example, if an executive action occurs in secret without other branches being aware of it (say, secret 
surveillance of citizens), the fact that such a practice has occurred is not grounds for saying that a 
consensus among the branches of government exists in support of it. 
158 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867). 
159 Matthew Hall, Who Has Standing to Sue the President over Allegedly Unconstitutional 
Emoluments?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 768 (2017). In effect, standing exists when a plaintiff suffers 
an institutional injury that amounts to vote nullification. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823, 826 
(1997) (distinguishing between “vote nullification” and “abstract dilution of institutional legislative 
power”).  
160 Such suits might have a better chance if Congress as a whole brought suit. Such actions are 
extremely rare. See ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43712, ARTICLE III STANDING AND 
CONGRESSIONAL SUITS AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1 (2014) (standing found only four times in 
forty-one years, with three of the four times concerning enforcement of congressional subpoenas).  
Some courts have suggested that standing is more likely when legislatures lack any other remedy 
to challenge executive practices. Id. at 7–8. This was suggested in Campbell v. Clinton, which involved 
a claim that President Clinton’s use of force was a violation of the War Powers Act and his constitutional 
authority. 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The D.C. Circuit noted that plaintiffs “enjoy[ed] ample 
legislative power to have stopped prosecution of the ‘war’” including the ability to pass a law forbidding 
 
 
308 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
Congress, of course, might initiate impeachment proceedings to express 
its opposition to the President’s failure to observe the specificity 
requirement. But that is an extreme remedy, and it seems unrealistic to 
expect Congress to take that action each time the President issues a 
non-specific pardon, especially in the run-of-the-mill criminal case. Indeed, 
given the lack of awareness about the common law limits on the pardon 
power, it would be extraordinary if Congress started the complex machinery 
of impeachment on the grounds that a pardon violated a procedural rule.161 
Congress, in short, has few realistic options to challenge a vague, 
non-specific pardon.162 
If Congress is poorly positioned to police the boundaries of the 
specificity requirement, one might think that it counts for something that the 
third branch of government—the federal judiciary—has made virtually no 
mention of the specificity requirement in the past 230 years. But this is really 
not surprising. Challenges to pardons are extremely rare, for obvious 
reasons. The only entities that seem likely to have standing to challenge a 
pardon are the two parties to the case—the defendant and the prosecutor.163 
                                                                                                                     
the use of U.S. forces or restrict funding for American participation in the conflict through the 
appropriations power. Id. at 23. The court also stated that “there always remains the possibility of 
impeachment should a President act in disregard of Congress’ authority on these matters.” Id. What 
counts as a legislative remedy remains unclear in the pardon context. See DOLAN, supra, at 13–14 (noting 
that existing case law has not specifically defined what constitutes a legislative remedy). As a result, this 
consideration may cut both ways. On one hand, the legislature always has impeachment as remedy for 
challenging improper pardons. On the other hand, short of that extreme remedy, Congress has limited 
options. 
161 Even if Congress were to initiate impeachment proceedings in more high-profile cases (such as 
George H.W. Bush’s pardon of the Iran-Contra conspirators), it would not be clear that this action 
signified Congress’ view that the pardon was unconstitutional; rather it might simply reflect a belief that 
the pardon was based on illicit motives, an entirely different rationale.    
162 Another option might be for Congress to adopt non-binding resolutions declaring a 
vaguely-drafted pardon unlawful. Again, in the case of a run-of-the mill pardon, it is highly unlikely for 
Congress or its committees to take such a step, and it is not clear that such a resolution would be counted 
as part of the relevant historical practice.  
One of the few formal efforts to repudiate a presidential pardon occurred soon after the Civil War, 
when Andrew Johnson granted amnesty to Confederates fighting the Union armies. Following that 
action, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report declaring the amnesty invalid (on the grounds that 
the amnesty lacked congressional authorization). S. REP. NO. 40-239, at 2–3 (1869). I am not aware of 
any congressional action, however, criticizing pardons on specificity grounds. Given the infrequency of 
such pardons, however, that silence may not be entirely surprising. 
163 Ordinary members of the public lack standing to bring such a challenge, since they do not have 
the kind of concrete injury required to bring suit. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–
74 (1992) (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the 
public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); McCord v. Ford, 398 F. Supp. 750, 
755 (D.D.C. 1975) (“When a President exercises [the] authority to pardon, as he frequently does, his 
action . . . cannot be reviewed by a court on the mere complaint of a citizen.” (quoting Koffler v. Ford, 
Civil No. 74-1406 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1974))). 
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However, except in the most unusual case, the defendant—the recipient of a 
pardon—would be loath to challenge a pardon.164 That leaves the prosecutor 
as the principal entity in a position to dispute a pardon’s validity. Yet 
prosecutors are not the most promising agents for vindicating the specificity 
requirement’s relevance. 
As a preliminary matter, a prosecutor may have limited standing to bring 
a challenge, particularly in cases where the pardon is issued after sentencing. 
Whether standing exists in such cases would depend on whether the 
prosecutor is seen as having a continuing interest in the case after its 
completion. Since most pardons occur after sentencing, this may prove a 
significant limitation on the prosecution’s ability to challenge a pardon.165   
Even assuming a prosecutor could challenge the validity of a pardon, 
she would face significant institutional obstacles in doing so. Prosecutors are 
part of the executive branch and formally under the direction of the Attorney 
General and, through her, the President.166 A President, concerned about a 
disobedient U.S. Attorney, could remove the prosecutor from office. As a 
                                                                                                                     
A court could, on its own initiative, review the validity of a pardon, but it is unlikely to do so absent 
a motion from the parties themselves or special circumstances. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Unlike probation, pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been 
the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”). In 
exceptional cases, it is conceivable that a court might, on its own, hold a hearing to review the validity 
of a pardon short-circuiting the criminal process supervised by the judge. One example is President 
Trump’s pardon of Sheriff Arpaio. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10186, 
CAN THE PRESIDENT PARDON CONTEMPT OF COURT? PROBABLY YES. 1–2 (2018) (discussing procedure 
leading to review of Arpaio pardon). What made that case unusual is that the pardon implicated the 
court’s own enforcement powers, which may explain the court’s belief in its authority to review the 
pardon. It remains unclear whether courts have authority to hold such hearings in other pardon cases 
where no one challenges the pardon. 
164 One of those exceptionally rare circumstances arose in Burdick. For details, see supra note 20. 
Burdick appears to be the only Supreme Court case where a defendant challenged the pardon on the 
grounds that it lacked appropriate specificity about the offense. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 
93 (1915). There, the Supreme Court sidestepped that issue, ruling in Burdick’s favor on other grounds. 
Id. at 91, 93. 
165 There is also the awkward question whether a prosecutor, who is ostensibly representing the 
executive branch, has standing to challenge conduct by the President of the United States, the head of the 
executive branch. Can the executive branch sue itself? Some precedent from the Watergate era suggests 
the answer is yes, under appropriate circumstances. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691–92 
(1974) (highlighting the potential legal issues for suing a President for contempt); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1405–08 (1999) (discussing Leon Jaworski’s standing 
to sue Richard Nixon). 
166 The President retains the ultimate power to fire the Attorney General, as well as individual U.S. 
Attorneys. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). Despite this power, individual prosecutors retain a degree of 
independence regarding how they pursue investigations. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can 
the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2018) (“United States Attorneys 
and other subordinate DOJ lawyers are, in theory, subject to the Attorney General’s specific direction, 
although, as a practical matter, subordinate prosecutors maintain substantial autonomy . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). Moreover, the legal authority of the President to control the course of specific investigations, 
short of firing prosecutors, remains controversial. See id. at 30–31 (discussing Supreme Court decisions 
that have questioned limiting the President’s ability to discharge independent prosecutors). 
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practical matter, then, it would be highly unusual for an ordinary prosecutor 
to challenge a pardon issued by the chief executive of the nation.  
The most likely scenario where a challenge would occur would be in 
cases involving a special prosecutor of some sort, one who is appointed to 
investigate executive branch malfeasance and who, through regulation or 
law, maintains some degree of independent prosecutorial authority.167 Few 
cases over the nation’s history meet those requirements, if only because 
independent or special prosecutors are of relatively recent vintage.168   
The two examples that come closest to satisfying these requirements are 
the pardons of Richard Nixon and the Iran-Contra conspirators.169 In both 
cases, the pardons were issued in the face of special prosecutor 
investigations. Additionally, questions arose about whether they were issued 
                                                                                                                     
167 Various types of independent prosecutors have been utilized in the past, including “special 
prosecutors,” “special counsels,” and “independent counsels.” For a useful glossary of terms, see 
CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSEL 
INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 2 (2019). In this Article, I use 
the term “independent prosecutor” to refer to a federal prosecutor appointed to investigate the executive 
branch and who, for political and/or legal reasons, possesses a significant degree of independence from 
ordinary Department of Justice oversight. In practice, this encompasses special prosecutors and special 
counsel appointed under either the Ethics in Government Act (when in force) or Department of Justice 
regulations. 
168 Until the Watergate era, the use of independent prosecutors was rare. See KATY J. HARRIGER, 
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 41–42 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that Watergate 
placed special prosecutors “on the agenda” of Congress). In 1973, pursuant to Department of Justice 
guidelines, Attorney General Elliot Richardson appointed special prosecutor Archibald Cox to 
investigate allegations of executive abuse. The President subsequently ordered Cox fired, triggering the 
so-called Saturday Night Massacre. BROWN & COLE, supra note 167, at 3. 
Though legal, the President’s actions carried a heavy political cost and hastened his downfall. To 
insulate special prosecutors from presidential control, Congress subsequently enacted the 1978 Ethics in 
Government Act. The Act authorized a three-judge panel to appoint a “special prosecutor” (subsequently 
called an “independent counsel”) to investigate criminal wrongdoings. The Act proved controversial, and 
it was left to expire in 1999. In its stead, the Department of Justice enacted regulations to authorize the 
Attorney General to appoint lawyers from outside the government to serve as a “special counsel” in cases 
where potential conflicts of interest might exist. Special prosecutors are considered to be somewhat 
independent from the rest of the executive branch. Among other things, they are “not subject to ‘day-to-
day supervision’ by any official and are vested ‘within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power 
and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States 
Attorney.’” BROWN & COLE, supra note 167, at 1. 
Robert Mueller was appointed subject to these regulations. Office of Deputy Attorney Gen., Order 
No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 
Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/967231/download. While ultimately removable by the President, Mueller enjoyed a degree 
of independence, and he remained in the job despite the President’s stated desire to see him removed.   
169 In Richard Nixon’s case, a special prosecutor had been appointed to investigate possible 
presidential misdeeds. The investigation into Nixon’s crimes was cut short when Ford issued a pardon to 
the former President. Macgill, supra note 5, at 61. The pardons in the Iran-Contra case also cut short the 
trials of at least two of the six co-conspirators, while freeing the other four from the consequences of 
their convictions. See Carl Levin, The Iran-Contra Pardons: Was It Wrong for Ex-President Bush to 
Pardon Six Defendants?, 79 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (1993) (explaining the consequences of the pardon and 
arguing that the Iran-Contra pardons undermine independent counsels). 
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for self-serving, improper motives.170 Of the two, the Nixon pardon was the 
most vulnerable to challenge, since it was crafted in exceptionally broad 
language.171 Some on Leon Jaworski’s staff reportedly supported contesting 
the pardon.172 For unclear reasons, Jaworski chose not to take such a 
dramatic step.173   
The point of this extended discussion is straightforward: Even if, 
counterfactually, one were to find a historical practice in support of 
non-specific pardons, one cannot assume this implies an interbranch 
consensus on their validity. One can infer such an agreement only when 
                                                                                                                     
170 The Iran-Contra pardons were viewed as problematic by some commentators, who saw the 
pardons as efforts by President Bush to stymie investigations that might prove embarrassing for the Bush 
Administration. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and 
Accountability in the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1989) (“[T]he Iran-Contra 
episode raises the possibility that a pardon could be motivated by the personal self-interest of the 
President who could halt criminal proceedings in order to suppress information about his own 
misdeeds.”).   
The Nixon pardon was even more controversial, with some going so far as to claim that Ford 
reached a deal with Nixon to pardon him in exchange for the presidency. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Gerald 
Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349, 361 (2010) (discussing 
“suspicions [Ford] had made a deal with Haig,” though ultimately concluding that “[t]hose suspicions 
were apparently groundless”); Did Gerald Ford Agree to Nixon Pardon Before Taking Office?, 
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 27, 2006), https://www.democracynow.org/2006/12/27/did_gerald_ford_ 
agree_to_nixon (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (indicating that Victor Navasky, Publisher Emeritus of The 
Nation, stated that Ford’s statement regarding Nixon’s pardon was “an attempt to put a gloss of innocence 
on a deal they had made”). Others believed that Ford sincerely felt a pardon was in the public interest. 
Some of this latter group nonetheless felt he acted prematurely. Richard Ben-Veniste, the former Chief 
of the Watergate Taskforce of the Special Prosecutor’s office, took this position. As he explained:  
Had Ford kept to his original plan and allowed time for formal charges to be lodged 
against Nixon, spelling out the specifics of his culpability, it would have been up to 
Nixon to either accept the pardon or fight the charges in court. But pardoning Nixon 
without requiring at least an acknowledgment of responsibility for serious misconduct 
and for lying to the public left the door open for the spate of revisionist books and 
articles that followed the resignation. 
Richard Ben-Veniste, The Pardon in History’s Hindsight, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801054.html; see also 
Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is Our Cynicism 
Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 166–68 (1999) (discussing the impact of pardon on public information 
concerning Watergate and related scandals).  
171 See Proclamation No. 4311, supra note 7 (demonstrating the broad language of the Nixon 
pardon). The Special Prosecutor could have challenged the pardon by indicting the President, requiring 
him to plead the pardon in return. That would have provided an opportunity to litigate the pardon’s 
validity. 
172 Warren Weaver, Jr., Experts Assert Some Nixon Legal Problems Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/10/archives/experts-assert-some-nixon-legal-problems-
remain-court-review.html. 
173 The special counsel in the Iran-Contra case, Lawrence Walsh, had a more difficult route to 
challenging the Bush pardon. To do so, he would have had to file new charges that were not listed in the 
specific pardon language. If the defendants then tried to use the pardon to avoid prosecution, Walsh 
would have had an opportunity to challenge the pardon order. Of course, this tactic rested on the 
assumption that Walsh could have identified additional charges relevant in the case. 
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other branches have an opportunity to challenge and dispute the practice. 
Indeed, without such an opportunity, unconstitutional practices would 
become law simply by being insulated from attack. Presidential pardons 
benefit from that kind of insulation as they are largely immune from 
legislative control or judicial review.174 Thus, even if we assume for the sake 
of argument that a history of vague pardons exists, that practice would 
deserve little or no interpretive weight. 
IV. DONALD TRUMP AND THE SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT 
The specificity requirement is a modest limitation on presidential power. 
It requires the President to specify the particular offense that he or she 
intends to pardon, either by identifying the crime or by referring to charges 
listed in an indictment or conviction. The rule does not prevent the President 
from granting mercy to any person or for any crime, and it does not require 
a significant change in practice. Presidents have typically satisfied the 
requirement when issuing pardons. If that is the case, one may wonder if the 
formal adoption of the specificity requirement would be particularly 
significant. The answer is that it may in fact prove vitally important, in light 
of the increased risk today that pardons will be used for self-interested, 
partisan, and corrupt reasons. 
Since the 1970s, several controversial pardons have come to the public’s 
attention. Two of the most obvious are President Ford’s pardon of Nixon 
and President Bush’s pardon of the Iran-Contra defendants. Commentators 
have argued, with more or less persuasiveness, that both of these pardons 
were made for illicit motives.175 More recently, President Clinton’s pardon 
of Marc Rich was widely seen as a payoff to a major campaign 
contributor.176   
President Trump brings the danger to a new level. In his first year of 
office, the President has issued highly questionable pardons to supporters, 
such as Dinesh D’Souza and Joe Arpaio. Even more egregiously, he has 
threatened to use the pardon power to disrupt investigations into his own, 
potentially criminal, conduct. Thus, the President seems to have hinted at 
the possibility of offering a pardon to his former campaign chairman, Paul 
                                                                                                                     
174 See Maddie McMahon & Jack Goldsmith, The Executive Branch’s Extraordinarily Broad View 
of the Presidential Pardon Power, LAWFARE (May 31, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
executive-branchs-extraordinarily-broad-view-presidential-pardon-power (noting that since 1866 the 
Supreme Court has held that pardon power is not subject to legislative control and that there is only a 
possibility that pardons may be reviewed by courts). 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (discussing Ford’s pardon of Nixon and Bush’s 
pardon of the Iran-Contra defendants). 
176 See, e.g., Editorial, An Indefensible Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A18; E.J. Dionne, Jr., 
Bill Clinton’s Last Outrage; The President’s Defenders Feel Betrayed by His Pardon of Marc Rich, 
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Manafort. The purpose of such an offer is not certain, but it appeared to be 
motivated by a desire to undercut the Special Counsel’s leverage over 
Manafort.177   
If the President carries through on these threats, he may be tempted to 
issue a broad, non-specific pardon. A vague pardon of this sort—such as a 
pardon for “all felonies” committed over a period of time—would leave the 
nature of the immunized conduct uncertain.178 In that way, it would create a 
fog of ambiguity that could help the President avoid scrutiny and 
controversy.179   
Given the elevated risk of a self-interested pardon, the specificity 
requirement gains heightened significance. The requirement offers a number 
of benefits, some of which have been touched on in earlier sections. At a 
most basic level, the specificity requirement guards against a pardon that 
unintentionally applies to crimes beyond the President’s intent or 
knowledge. For example, on a charitable reading, President Trump might 
honestly believe that Paul Manafort (or Roger Stone or Michael Flynn) has 
been unfairly targeted by the special prosecutor. Even so, if Trump issues a 
                                                                                                                     
177 See, e.g., Natasha Bach, Trump’s Latest Tweets Hint at Pardon for Paul Manafort—But Nothing 
for Michael Cohen, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/08/22/trump-tweets-manafort-
cohen/; Telegraph Reporters, Donald Trump Says He’s Considering Pardon for Paul Manafort, 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 23, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/23/donald-trump-
says-considering-pardon-paul-manafort/ (discussing President Trump’s potential pardon of Paul 
Manafort). 
178 This is particularly true when a non-specific pardon is made preemptively (i.e., before 
indictment). In that case, knowledge of the offender’s wrongdoings may be particularly obscure, 
generating a particularly heavy fog around what precisely is being vacated. Richard Nixon’s pardon was 
criticized for precisely this reason, with some arguing that President Ford should have waited until after 
indictment to pardon Nixon. That way, the public would have at least been clear about which crimes 
Richard Nixon had committed. 
Given the ambiguous scope of a preemptive pardon, the Office of Legal Counsel has warned that 
such pardons should only be used in the most exceptional cases. Pardoning Power of the President, 6 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 20–21 (1853) (“[I]t has been held unwise and inexpedient, as a general rule, to interpose the 
pardoning power in anticipation of trial and condemnation, although particular circumstances may exist 
to justify such an exceptional act on the part of the President.”). Tellingly, the Attorney General’s Office 
has also stated that, when preemptive pardons are issued, details of the recipients’ crimes and guilt should 
be articulated. Id. (“The President of the United States has, undoubtedly, the power to grant a pardon as 
well before conviction as afterwards. . . . But there must be satisfactory evidence of some kind as to the 
guilt of the party.”). Current Department of Justice regulations go even farther, stating that: 
No petition for a pardon should be filed until . . . at least five years after the date of 
the release of the petitioner from confinement or, in case no prison sentence was 
imposed, until the expiration of a period of at least five years after the date of the 
conviction of the petitioner. 
Eligibility for Filing Petition for Pardon, 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1999). 
179 Duker, supra note 9, at 504. As William Duker has observed, those arguing for an unfettered 
pardon power fail “to recognize the disadvantages connected with secrecy and the pardoning power: ‘If 
the history of civilization proves nothing else, it proves that where secrecy cloaks the use of power it also 
cloaks the abuse of power.’” Id. 
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pardon for “all crimes” committed over a period of time, he may end up 
absolving the recipient of crimes of which Trump was not aware.  
The more serious concern, of course, is that Trump is well aware of the 
crimes committed by his associates and wants to issue a pardon to protect 
himself from investigation. In that circumstance, a specificity requirement 
would serve an essential function. By requiring the President to be 
transparent about the specific offenses being pardoned, the requirement 
would deter the President from granting pardons for particularly egregious 
and problematic crimes. It is one thing to pardon an associate for all crimes 
committed in the past year, quite another to pardon the associate for, say, 
conspiring with a foreign power to disrupt the presidential elections.   
Transparency in pardoning, in other words, raises the political costs of 
pardons. To be sure, a desperate President, fearing that investigators are hot 
on his heels, might still decide to grant a pardon to his underlings or 
associates.180 But forcing the President to list the crimes pardoned still serves 
a purpose: it publicly exposes the nature of the recipient’s wrongdoing and 
thus permits public debate about the appropriateness of the pardon. In that 
way, the specificity requirement facilitates a debate about whether the 
pardon power has been misused and whether impeachment is an appropriate 
remedy. 
Transparency is only the first of several important benefits generated by 
the specificity requirement. The rule also limits the scope of any individual 
pardon. With a specificity rule in place, a single pardon cannot give the 
recipient any guarantee that he won’t be subject to a subsequent federal 
prosecution on different grounds. Thus, for example, Paul Manafort might 
hope that President Trump would pardon him for his crimes of conviction 
(and perhaps for other potential charges too). But he cannot be sure that the 
federal prosecutors would not bring up additional charges at some later time.  
Someone like Manafort might hope, if new charges are brought, that 
President Trump would issue a second pardon encompassing the new 
indictments. But the need to issue repeated pardons raises the political cost 
to the President, requiring him to name and highlight new crimes each time. 
Even more importantly, a defendant could not be assured that Trump would 
still be in office when the new charges were brought, leaving him vulnerable 
to prosecution without a protector. In short, a specificity requirement would 
make pardons—and particularly preemptive pardons—less final and less 
valuable, undermining the prospective value of a pardon and increasing the 
pressure on the accused to cooperate with investigators.181 
                                                                                                                     
180 Id. at 504 (“Experience . . . has shown that a President could partake in a subversion of the 
Constitution and risk ‘the damnation of his fame to all future ages.’”). 
181 The specificity requirement would also make “preemptive pardons”—that is, pardons prior to 
indictment—much less attractive. Because they are issued before conviction and indictment, preemptive 
pardons are issued without certainty over the ultimate charges that will be brought against the defendants. 
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Finally, a specificity requirement would make the option of a 
“self-pardon” far less attractive to the President. Scholars, of course, are far 
from certain that a President has the constitutional authority to pardon 
himself, and they have good reasons to be skeptical.182 Nonetheless, even if 
a self-pardon were permissible, the specificity requirement would reduce its 
usefulness. To ensure he would be fully insulated from prosecution, a 
President would have to offer a comprehensive list of each and every 
possible federal crime he had committed. Should he miss a charge, the 
President would remain vulnerable to federal prosecution upon leaving 
office. 
In the end, a specificity requirement cannot stop a desperate President 
from misusing the pardon power to hinder a federal investigation. But it can 
make the effort more difficult, and it can help bring to light the details of the 
crimes being absolved. Given the extraordinary breadth of the pardon power, 
and its anomalous role in the American constitutional system, the specificity 
requirement might seem like an exceptionally modest protection. Yet, the 
restriction may prove more significant than it first appears, resting as it does 
on a powerful insight, famously articulated by Justice Brandeis, that 
transparency may be the best remedy for governmental abuse.183   
CONCLUSION 
The argument for a specificity requirement is strong. It is justified under 
an originalist reading of the Constitution, and it is fully consistent with the 
core ideals of the nation’s founding. Of course, to say that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
If lawful, vague and general preemptive pardons would be a particularly useful tool for a President 
seeking to cover up crimes, since that kind of pardon could be used to disrupt an investigation relatively 
early in the process and could be issued without naming particular charges. The specificity requirement 
thus reduces the appeal of preemptive pardons. To use a preemptive pardon in that situation, a President 
would need to speculate on the kinds of crimes that the recipient might be charged with, and the recipient 
would be left with the risk that the pardon would prove insufficient. 
182 See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential 
Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 809 (1996) (“Presidents cannot pardon themselves.”); James Pfiffner, 
Pardon Power, HERITAGE FOUND. HERITAGE GUIDE TO CONST., 
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/89/pardon-power (last visited Oct. 11, 2019) 
(“The possibility of a President pardoning himself for a crime is not precluded by the explicit language 
of the Constitution. . . . But a broader reading of the Constitution and the general principles of the 
traditions of United States law might lead to the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutionally 
impermissible. It would seem to violate the principles that a man should not be a judge in his own case; 
that the rule of law is supreme and the United States is a nation of laws, not men; and that the President 
is not above the law.”); see also Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, 1 Op. O.L.C. 370, 
370 (1974) (“This raises the question whether the President can pardon himself. Under the fundamental 
rule that no one may be a judge in his own case, it would seem that the question should be answered in 
the negative.”).  
183 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).   
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should interpret the Pardon Clause to include a specificity requirement is not 
to say that it will do so. The Supreme Court often acts in mysterious ways, 
and it may turn a blind eye to the original meaning of the clause.184  
Nonetheless, in the current political climate, even the possibility that the 
federal courts might adopt a specificity requirement is significant. Any 
individual who relies on the prospect of receiving a broad, unlimited pardon 
to insulate himself from prosecution must discount the value of that pardon 
by the risk that such a pardon might be vulnerable to challenge.185 As the 
prospective value of a vague pardon declines, the attractiveness of reaching 
a deal with the prosecution increases.   
That leads to the final, and perhaps counterintuitive, point. Regardless 
of how the courts ultimately rule on this issue, simply starting a conversation 
about the validity of the specificity requirement might have a practical 
impact on the course of the various investigations into the 2016 election. 
Increased awareness about the vulnerability of general pardons to legal 
challenge strengthens the hand of the investigators. That, in turn, increases 




                                                                                                                     
184 Moreover, to bring a test case, a prosecutor like Robert Mueller would need to be willing to 
challenge an overly broad pardon. 
185 The defendant might receive a more specific pardon, of course, and avoid the danger. But such 
a pardon would be far less beneficial, since it would leave the defendant open to future prosecution should 
new facts emerge about possible wrongdoings. 
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7/10/1795 Washington Pennsylvania Insurgents 
during Fries Rebellion 
Yes 
5/21/1800 Adams Individuals prosecuted under 
Alien & Seditions Act 
Yes 
3/5/1804 Jefferson Military deserters Yes 




Madison Barataria pirates for desertion Yes 
2/6/1815 Madison Certain persons who inhabited 
New Orleans, adjacent area, 
or Barataria Island. 
X 
6/12/1830 Jackson Cherokee Indians 
(incorporated into treaty) 
X 
8/6/1846 Polk Political prisoners prosecuted 
under Sedition Act 
Yes 
3/10/1863 Lincoln Deserters Yes 
12/8/1863 Lincoln Persons who participated in 
rebellion 
Yes* 
3/11/1865 Lincoln Deserters Yes 
5/29/1865 Johnson Persons who participated in 
rebellion 
Yes* 
9/7/1867 Johnson Persons who have committed 
treason 
Yes 
7/4/1868 Johnson Persons who have committed 
treason  
Yes 
12/25/1868 Johnson Persons who have committed 
treason 
Yes 
12/13/1873 Grant Sailors and marines for 
desertion 
Yes 
1/4/1893 Harrison Members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints for bigamy 
Yes 
9/25/1894 Cleveland Members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints 
Yes 
6/21/1900 McKinley Insurrectionists in the X 
                                                                                                                     
186 The contents of this appendix were compiled by the author and his research assistants through 
the use of publicly available sources. The information and sources are on file with the author. 
 
318 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
Philippine Islands  
7/4/1902 T. 
Roosevelt 
Insurrectionists in the 
Philippine Islands 
X 
6/14/1917 Wilson Certain individuals under 
suspended sentence 
X 
3/5/1924 Coolidge Military deserters in WWI Yes 
12/23/1933 F. 
Roosevelt 
Individuals convicted of 
violating espionage or draft 
laws during WWI 
Yes 
12/24/1945 Truman WWII veterans who violated 
federal law prior to military 
service 
X 
12/23/1947 Truman Persons who violated draft 
laws during WWII 
Yes 
12/24/1952 Truman Certain Korean War veterans 
who violated federal law prior 
to military service 
X 
12/24/1952 Truman Servicemen convicted of 
desertion between the end of 
WWII and start of Korean 
War 
Yes 
9/16/1974 Ford Vietnam era draft evaders and 
deserters 
Yes 
1/21/1977 Carter Draft law violators Yes 
*An asterisk signifies that the offense was implied by language, but not explicit. 
 
